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LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, J 



Chap. _P .T *l3 



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 




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THE 




CAMPAIGN IS YIElllSIi 



JULY AND AIT(3MTST 1862. 




OFFICIAL HEFOUT | 



MAJOR GENERAL JOHN POPE. 




MILWAUKEE: 
JERMAIN & BRIGHTMAN, BOOK AND JOB PRINTERS, 3ENTIi\EL BUILDING. 

1863. 




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CAMPAIGN IN 



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GENERAL POPE'S OFFICIAL REPORT. 



New York, January 27th, 1863. 
General: 

I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations 
of the army under my command during the late campaign in Vir- 
ginia : 

Several of the reports of Corps Commanders have not yet reached 
me, but so much time has elapsed since the termination of the cam- 
paign, that I do not feel at liberty to withhold this report longer. 

The strange misapprehension of facts concerning this campaign, 
which, though proceeding from irresponsible sources, has much pos- 
sessed the public mind, makes it necessary for me to enter more into 
detail than I should otherwise have done, and to embody in the report 
such of the dispatches and orders sent and received as will make clear 
every statement which is contained in it. 

On the 26th day of June, 1862, by special order of the President 
of the United States, I was assigned to the command of the Army of 
Virginia. That army was constituted as follows : 

First Corps, under Major-Gen. Fremont. 

Second Corps, under Major-Gen. Banks. 

Third Corps, under Major-Gen. McDowell. 

In addition to these three Corps, a small unorganized force 
under Brig.-General Sturgis was posted in the neighborhood of Alexan- 
dria, and was then in process of being organised for field service. 
The forces in the entrenchments around Washington were also placed 
under my command. All the disposable moveable forces consisted of 
the three Corps first named. Their effective strength of infantry and 
artillery as reported to me was as follows : 

Fremont's Corps, eleven thousand five hundred strong; Banks' 
Corps, reported at fourteen thousand and five hundred, but in reality 
only about eight thousand ; McDowell's Corps, eighteen thousand four 
hundred — making a total of thirty-eight thousand men. 

The cavalry numbered about five thousand, but most of it was badly 
mounted and armed, and in poor condition for service. These forces 
were scattered over a wide district of country, not within supporting 



distance of eacli other, and many of the brigades and divisions were 
badly organized, and in a demoralized condition. This was particu- 
larly the case with the Army Corps of Major-Gren. Fremont, a sad 
report of which was made to me by Gen. Sigel, when he relieved Gen. 
Fremont in command of the Corps. 

My first labors were directed to the reorganization of some of the 
divisions and brigades of that Corps, and to supplying the whole force 
with much of the material absolutely necessary for troops in the field. 

The Corps of Banks and Fremont were in the Valley of the Shenan- 
doah, between Winchester and Middletown, the bulk of the forces 
being in the vicinity of the latter place. 

One division of McDowell's Corps was at Manassas Junction, with 
its advance thrown forward to Catlett's Station. The other division 
was posted in the vicinity of Falmouth, opposite Fredericksburgh. 

When I first assumed command of these forces, the troops under 
Jackson had retired from the Valley of the Shenandoah and were in 
rapid march toward Richmond, so that, at that time, there was no force 
of the enemy of any consequence within a week's march of any of the 
troops assigned to my command. 

It was the wish of the Government that I should cover the city of 
Washington from any attacks from the direction of Richmond, make 
such dispositions as were necessary to assure the safety of the Valley of 
the Shenandoah, and at the same time so to operate upon the enemy's 
lines of coQimunication in the direction of Gordonsville and Charlotts- 
ville, as to draw ofi", if possible, a considerable force of the enemy 
from Richmond, and thus relieve the operations against that city of 
the army of the Potomac. 

The first object I had in view was to concentrate, as far as 
possible, all the moveable forces under my command, and to estab- 
lish them in such positions as best to effect the objects set forth. 
It seemed to me that the security of the Shenandoah Valley 
was not best attained by posting troops within the Valley itself, but 
that the necessary results could be better accomplished, and the other 
objects with which I was charged best promoted, by concentrating 
these forces at some point or points from which, if any attempts were 
made to enter the Valley of the Shenandoah from Richmond, I should 
be able, by rapid marching, to interpose between such force and the 
main body of the enemy, and cut oft' its retreat. 1 felt confident, and 
this confidence was justified by subsequent results, that no considera- 
ble force of the enemy would attempt to enter the Valley of the Shen- 
andoah while the forces under my command were so posted as to be 
able without difficulty to intercept its retreat and fall upon its rear. — 
I accordingly sent orders to Maj.-Gen. Sigel, commanding the First 
Corps, to move forward from Middletown, cross the Shenandoah at 
Front Royal, and pursuing the west side of the Blue Ridge, to take 
post at S perry ville, by passing through Luray Gap. At the same time 
I directed Major-Gen. Banks, crossing the Shenandoah at the same 
point, to move forward and take post between six and ten miles east of 
Sperry ville. Gen. McDowell was ordered to move Ricketts' Division 



of his Corps from Manassas Junction to "Waterloo Bridge, the point 
where the turnpike from Warrenton to Sperryville crosses the Upper 
Rappahannock. King's Division of the same Corps it was thought 
best to leave at Fredericksburgh, to cover the crossing of the Rappa- 
hannock at that point, and to protect the railroad thence to Aquia 
Creek, and the public buildings which had been erected at the latter 
place. While I yielded to this wish of the War Department, the wide 
separation of this division from the main body of the army, and the 
ease with which the enemy would be able to interpose between them 
engaged my earnest attention and gave me very serious uneasiuess. 

While these movements were in progress, commenced the series of 
battles which preceded and attended the retreat of Gen. McClellan 
from the Chickahominy toward Harrison's landing. When first Gren. 
McClellan began to intimate by his dispatches that he designed making 
this movement towards James River, I suggested to the President of 
the United States the impolicy of such a movement, and the serious 
consequences which would be likely to result from it^ and urged upon 
him that he should send orders to Gen. McClellan that if he were 
unable to maintain his position upon the Chickahominy, and were 
pressed by superior forces of the enemy, to mass his whole force on 
the north side of that stream, even at the risk of losing much mate- 
rial of war, and endeavor to make his way in the direction of Hanover 
Court House ; but in no event to retreat with his army further to the 
South than the "White House on York River. I stated to the Presi- 
dent that the retreat to James River was carrying Gen McClellan 
away from any reinforcements that could possibly be sent him within 
a reasonable time, and was absolutely depriving him of any substan- 
tial aid from the forces under my command; that by this movement 
the whole army of the enemy would be interposed betweea his army 
and mine, and that they would then be at liberty to strike in either 
direction, as they might consider it most advantageous; that this move- 
ment to James River would leave entirely unprotected, except in so far 
as the small force under my command was able to protect it, the whole 
region in front of Washington, and that it would then, therefore, be 
impossible to send any of the forces under my command to reinforce 
Gen. McClellan without rendering it certain that the enemy, even in 
the worst case for themselves, would have the privilege and power of 
exchanging Richmond for "Washington City; that to them the loss of 
Richmond would be trifling, while the loss of "Washington to us would 
be conclusive, or nearly so, in its results upon this war. I was so 
deeply impressed with these wiews that I repeatedly and earnestly 
urged them upon the President and the Secretary of War. 

After Gen. McClellan had taken up his position at Harrison's 
Landing, I addressed to him a letter, stating my position and 
the distribution of the troops under my command, and request- 
ing him, in all earnestness and good faith, to write me fully and 
freely his views, and to suggest to me any measures which he 
thought desirable to enable me to co-operate with him, or to render 
any assistance in my power in the operations of the army under his 



command. I stated to him that I had no object except to assist 
his operations, and that I would undertake any labor and run any 
risk for that purpose. I therefore desired him to feel no hesitation 
in communicating freely with me, as he might rest assured that 
every suggestion that he would make would meet all respect and 
consideration at my hands, and that so far as it was in my power to do 
so, I would carry out his wishes with all energy, and with all the 
means at my command. In reply to this communication, I received a 
letter from Gen. McClellan, very general in terms, and projDOsing 
nothing toward the accomplishment of the purpose I had suggested to 
him. It became apparent that, considering the situation in which the 
Army of the Potomac and the Army of Virginia were placed in rela- 
tion to each other, and the absolute necessity of harmonious and 
prompt co-operation between them, some military superior both of 
Gren. McClellan and myself should be called to "Washington and placed 
in command of all the operations in Virginia. In accordance with 
these views, Major-G-en. Halleck was called to Washington and placed 
in general command. Many circumstances, which it is not necessary 
here to set forth, induced me to express to the President, to the Sec- 
retary of War, and to Gen. Halleck, my desire to be relieved from the 
command of the Army of Virginia, and to be returned to the Western 
country. My services, however, were considered necessary in the pro- 
jected campaign, and my wishes were not complied with." I accord- 
ingly took the field in Virginia with grave forebodings of the result, 
but with a determination to carry out the plans of the Government 
with all the energy and with all the ability of which I was master. 

Previous to taking the field I issued the following orders,* which 
set out very fully the policy which I considered advisable, and which, 
at the time, received the sanction of the Government, and, so far as I 
know, the approval of the country. 

The order requiring the troops to subsist upon the country in which 
their operations were conducted has, with a wilful disregard of its 
terms, been construed greatly to my discredit, as authorizing indis- 
criminate robbery and plunder. Yet the terms of this order are so 
specific as to the manner and by whom all property or subsistence 
needed for the use of the army should be seized, and the order is so 
common in the history of warfare, that I have been amazed that it 
could be so misinterpreted and misunderstood. It is, therefore, sub- 
mitted here for the calm examination of the Government and of the 
public. I believed then, and believe now, that the policy there laid 
down was wise and just, and was well calculated to secure efficient and 
rapid operations of the army ; and in case of reverse, to leave the 
enemy without the means of subsisting in the country over which our 
army had passed, and over which any pursuit must be conducted. 
The long delay and embarrassment of the army under General Lee, 
in its subsequent movements toward Washington, occasioned largely 
by the want of supplies taken from the country under this order, fully 
justified its wisdom. 

*See Appendix. 



KSvas determined, before I left Washington to take the field in 
Virginia, that the union of the armies of Virginia and of the Poto- 
mac was absolutely essential both to the safety of the National Capital 
and to the further successful prosecution of the operations against 
Kichmond. The mission of the army under my command, therefore, 
was to cover as far as possible the front of Washington, and make 
secure the Valley of the Shenandoah, and so to operate upon the ene- 
my's lines of communication to the west and northwest, as to force 
him to make such heavy detachments from his main force at Rich- 
mond as would enable the Army of the Potomac to withdraw from 
its position at Harrison's Landing; and to take shipping for Aquia 
Creek or for Alexandria; and if, as was feared, the enemy should 
throw his whole force in the direction of Washington, it became my 
duty to resist his advance at all hazards, and so to delay and embar- 
rass his movement as to gain all the time possible for the arrival of 
the Army of the Potomac behind the Rappahannock. 

Meantime, before the arrival of Glen. Halleck, I instructed Gen. 
King, at Fredericksburg, to send forward detachments of his cavalry 
to operate upon the line of the Virginia Central Railroad, and as far 
as possible to embarrass and destroy communication between Rich- 
mond and the Valley of the Shenandoah. Several cavalry expedi- 
tions which that officer dispatched for the purpose were completely 
successful, and succeeded in breaking up the railroad at several points 
upon several occasions. At the same time I directed Maj.-Gen. 
Banks to send forward an infantry brigade, with all his cavalry, to 
march rapidly upon Culpepper Court House, and after taking posses- 
sion of that place, to push forward cavalry toward the Rapidan, in the 
direction of Gordonsville, On the 14th of July, after this movement 
was successfully accomplished, I directed Gen, Banks to push forward 
during the night of that day, the whole of his cavalry force under 
Brig. -Gen. Hatch from Culpepper, with orders to take possession of 
Gordonsville, and to destroy the railroad for ten or fifteen miles east 
of that place, with a portion of this force, whilst the remainder should 
be pushed forward in the direction of Charlottesville, to destroy the 
railroad bridges and interrupt that line of communications as far as 
practicable. 

At that time there was no force of the enemy at Gordonsville or in the 
vicinity, and the whole operation asordered was notonly easily practica- 
ble, but would have been attended with serious consequences to the 
enemy ; but to my surprise and dissatisfaction, I received, on the 17th 
of July, from Gen. Banks, a report that Gen. Hatch had taken with him 
infantry, artillery and trains of wagons, and that in consequences of 
bad roads he had at that date only succeeded in going as far as Madi- 
son Court House. Meantime, on the 16th of July, the advance of 
Jackson's forces, under Ewell, had reached Gordonsville, and the 
proposed movement, as ordered, became impracticable. No satisfactory 
explanation has ever been made to me of the departure from my 
orders on the part of Gen. Hatch. Finding it no longer practicable 
to occupy Gordonsville as I had designed, I sent orders to Gen. Banks 



to direct G-en. Hatch to select from his own cavalry and that of Gen. 
McDowell, which I had sent forward, fifteen hundred to two thousand 
of the best mounted men, and to proceed from Madison Court House 
around the west side of the Blue Ridge, to a point whence he could 
make an easy descent upon the railroad west of Gordonsville, and, if 
successful, to push forward to Charlottesville, and if possible destroy 
the railroad between that place and Lynchburg. In compliance with, 
this order, Gen. Hatch commenced to make the movement as directed, 
but abandoned it very soon after he started, and returned by the way 
of Sperryville to his post. As soon as I had received the report of 
this second failure, I relieved Gen. Hatch from the command of the 
cavalry of Gen. Banks' corps, and sect Brig.-Gen. Buford to report 
to Gen. Banks as the Chief of Cavalry of his corps. 

On the 29th of July I left Washington, and, after reviewing 
Ricketts' division of McDowell's Corps at Waterloo Bridge, re- 
paired to the headquarters of Gen. Banks, a few miles southeast 
of Little Washington. All preparations having been completed, 
I instructed Gen. Banks to move forward on the 7th of August, 
and take post at the point where the turnpike from Sperryville 
to Culpepper crosses the Hazel River. Gen. McDowell was ordered on 
the day previous to move forward with Ricketts' division from 
Waterloo Bridge to Culpepper Court House, so that on the 7th of 
August all the infantry and artillery forces of the Army of Vir- 
ginia were assembled along the turnpike from Sperryville to Cul- 
pepper, and numbered about 28,000 men. Gen. King's division, 
as I have before stated, was left on the Lower Rappahannock, 
opposite Fredericksburg, and was not then available for active opera- 
tions in the direction of Gordonsville. The cavalry forces covering 
the front of the army on that day, were distributed as follows : Gen. 
Buford, with five regiments, was posted at Madison Court House, 
with his pickets along the line of the Rapidan, from Burnett's Ford 
as far west as the Blue Ridge. Gen. Sigel had been directed to post 
a brigade of infantry and a battery of artillery at the point where the 
road from Madison Court House to Sperryville crosses Robertson's 
River, as a support to the cavalry of Gen. Buford, in front of him. 
Gen. Bayard, with four regiments of cavalry, was posted near Rapi- 
dan Station, the point where the Orange and Alexandria road crosses 
Rapidan River, with his pickets extended as far to the east as Raccoon 
Ford, and connecting with Gen. Buford on his right at Burnett's 
Ford. From Raccoon Ford to the forks of the Rappahannock, above 
Falmouth, the Rapidan was lined with cavalry pickets. On the top 
of Thoroughfare Mountain, about half-way between Gens. Bayard and 
Buford, was established a signal station, which overlooked the whole 
country as far south as Orange Court House. 

On the 7th I proceeded to Sperryville, and inspected the Corps of 
Major-Gen. Sigel. I remained at Sperryville until 4 o'clock in the 
afternoon of that day, during which time I received sevei'al reports 
from the front that the enemy was crossing the Rappahannock at sev- 
eral points between the railroad crossing of that river and Liberty 



Mills. I reached Culpepper Court House on tte morning of the 8th of 
August. The town had been occupied for several days by Crawford's 
BrigaJe of Gen. Banks' Corps ; and on the 7th Ricketts' Division of 
McDowell's Corps had also reached there from Waterloo Bridge. 
During the whole of the morning of the 8th, I continued to receive 
reports from Gen. Bayard, who was slowly falling back in the direction 
of Culpepper Court House, from the advance of the enemy; and from 
Gen. Buford, who also reported the enemy advancing in heavy force 
upon Madison Court House. My instructions required me to be careful 
and keep my communications good with Fredericksburgh, and by no 
means to permit the enemy to interpose between me and that place. 
Although during the whole of the 8th of August, it was very doubt- 
ful, from the reports of Gens. Bayard and Buford, whether the ene- 
my's movement was in the direction of Madison Court House or of Cul- 
pepper, I considered it advisable, in view of my relations with Fred- 
ericksburgh, to concentrate my whole force in the direction of Cul- 
pepper, so as to keep myself constantly interposed between the main 
body of the enemy and the lower fords of the Rappahannock. Early 
in the day I pushed forward Crawford's Brigade of Banks' Corps, in 
the direction of Cedar or Slaughter Mountain, to support Gen. Bay- 
ard, who was falling back in the direction, and to assist him as far as 
practicable in determining the movements and the forces of the ene- 
my. I sent orders also to Gen. Banks to move forward promptly 
from Hazel River to Culpepper Court House, and also to Gen. Sigel to 
march at once from Sperryville to the same place. To my surprise, I 
received, after night on the 8th, a note from Gen. Sigel, dated at Sper- 
ryville, at 6 1-2 o'clock that afternoon, asking me by what road he 
should march to Culpepper Court House, As there was but one road 
between those two points, and that a broad stone turnpike, T was at a 
loss to understand how Gen. Sigel could entertain any doubt as to the 
road by which he should march. This doubt, however, delayed the 
arrival of his Corps at Culpepper Court House several hours, and ren- 
dered it impracticable for that Corps to be pushed to the front, as I had 
designed, on the afternoon of the next day. 

Early on the morning of the 9th of August, I directed Gen. Banks 
to move forward toward Cedar Mountain with his whole Corps, and to 
join the brigade of that Corps, under Gen. Crawford, which had been 
pushed forward on the day previous. I directed Gen. Banks to take 
up a strong position at or near the point occupied by that brigade, to 
check the advance of the enemy, and to determine his forces and the 
character of his movements as far as practicable. The consolidated 
report of Gen. Banks' Corps, received some days previously, exhibited 
an effective force of something over 14,000 men. Appended to this 
report will be found the return in question. It appeared subsequently 
however, that Gen. Banks' forces at that time did not exceed 8,000 
men. But although I several times called Gen. Banks' attention to 
the discrepancy between this return and the force he afterward stated 
to me he had led to the front, that discrepancy has never been ex- 
plained, and I do not yet understand how Gen. Banks could have 
been so greatly mistaken as to the forces under his immmediate command. 



I directed him when he went forward from Culpepper Court House, 
if the enemy advanced to attack him in the strong position which 
I had instructed him to take up, that he should push his skirmishers 
well to the front and notify me immediately. Three miles in his rear 
and within easy supporting distance, Ricketts' Division of McDowell's 
Corps had been posted at the point where the road from Madison Court 
House to Culpepper intersects the road from Culpepper to Cedar Moun- 
tain. This division was so posted because it was not certain whether 
a considerable force of the enemy was not advancing on Culpepper 
from the direction of Madison Court House, Gen. Buford having re- 
ported to me very early on the morning of the 9th from Madison 
Court House that the enemy was in heavy force on his right, his left, 
and partly on his rear, and that he was retreating in the direction of 
Sperryville. 

Desultory artillery firing had been kept up all day on the 9th, in the 
direction of Gen. Banks' Corps, but I continued to receive, during the 
whole of that day, reports from Gen. Banks that no considerable force 
of the enemy had come forward, that his cavalry had been ostenta- 
tiously displayed, but that he did not believe that the enemy was in suf- 
ficient force to make auy attack upon him. As late as 5 o'clock in the 
afternoon. Gen. Banks wrote me substantially to the same efiiect ; but 
before I had received this last note, the artillery firing had become so 
rapid and continuous, that I feared a general engagement was going 
on, or might be brought on at any moment. I therefore instructed 
Gen. McDowell to move forward Ricketts' Division rapidly to the field, 
and accompanied that division myself. At no time during the day did 
Gen. Banks express any apprehensions of attack in force by the ene- 
my, nor did he ask, nor intimate that he needed reinforcements. 

Gen. Sigel's Corps began to march into Culpepper Court House late 
in the afternoon, and just as I was leaving that place, having been 
delayed several hours by Gen. Sigel's singular uncertainty as to what 
road he ought to pursue. I had given orders a number of days pre- 
viously that all the troops belonging to the Army of Virginia should 
be ready to march at the shortest notice, and should habitually keep 
two day's cooked rations in their haversacks. Notwithstanding this 
order. Gen. Sigel's Corps arrived in Culpepper without any rations, 
and was unable to move forward until provisions could be procured 
from McDowell's train, and cooked at Culpepper Court House. 

I have received no report from Gen. Banks of his operations at Cedar 
Mountain, but I had sent forward Brig.-(ien. Roberts, Chief of Cav- 
alry, of my StaflF, and had directed him to report to Gen. Banks in 
the early part of the day of the 9th, and to advise freely with him as 
to the operations of his Corps. Gen. Roberts, as well as Gen. Banks, 
was fully advised of my wishes, and that I desired Gen. Banks merely 
to keep the enemy in check, by occupying a strong position in his 
front, until the whole of the disposable force under my command 
should be concentrated in the neighborhood. Gen. Roberts reported 
to me that he had conferred freely with Gen. Banks, and urgently rep- 
resented to him my purposes, but that Gen. Banks, contrary to his sug- 



9 

gestions and my wishes, tad left the strong position which he had 
taken up, and had advanced two miles to assault the enemy, believing 
that they were not in considerable force, and that he would be able to 
crush their advance before their main body could come up from the 
direction of the Rapidan. He accordingly threw forward his whole 
Corps into action, against superior forces of the enemy, strongly posted 
and sheltered by woods and ridges. His advance led him over the 
open ground, which was everywhere swept by the fire of the enemy, 
concealed in woods and ravines beyond. Notwithstanding these 
disadvantages, his Corps gallantly responded to his orders, and assaulted 
the enemy with great fury and determination. The action lasted about 
an hour and a half, and during that time our forces suffered heavy 
loss, and were gradually driven back to their former position, at which 
point, just at dusk, Ricketts' Division of McDoweH's Corps came up 
and joined in the engagement. 

As soon as I arrived on the field, at the head of Ricketts' Division, 
I directed Gen. Banks to draw in his right, which was much extended, 
and to mass the whole of his right wing at the centre of his line, push- 
ing forward at the same time Ricketts' Division to occupy the ground 
thus vacated. The enemy followed Banks as he retired with great 
caution, and emerging from the woods which had sheltered him all 
day, attempted to push forward to the open ground in front of our new 
line. A sharp artillery engagement immediately commenced, when 
the enemy was driven back to the woods, principally by the batteries of 
Ricketts' Division, The artillery firing was kept up until near mid- 
night of the 9th. Finding that Banks' Corps had been severely cut 
up, and was much fatigued, I drew it back to the rear, and pushed for- 
ward the Corps of Sigel, which had began to arrive, to occupy the 
woods on the left of the road, with a wide space of open ground in his 
front. Ricketts' Division was also drawn back to the cover of the woods 
and behind the ridges in the open ground on the right of Sigel. These 
dispositions were completed about daybreak on the morning of the 10th. 
Banks' Corps, reduced to about 5,000 men, was so cut up, and worn 
down with fatigue, that I did not consider it capable of rendering any 
efl&cient service for several days. I therefore directed Gen. Banks, or 
in his absence Gen. Williams, who succeeded to the command, to as- 
semble his Corps on the road to Culpepper Court House, and about two 
miles in rear of our front, to collect his stragglers, send back his 
wounded to Culpepper Court House, and proceed as rapidly as possible 
to put the Corps in condition for service. In consequence of the vig- 
orous resistance of the night previous, and the severe loss of the ene- 
my in trying to advance, before daylight of the 10th, Jackson drew 
back his forces toward Cedar Mountain, about two miles from our 
front. Our pickets were immediately pushed forward, supported by 
Milroy's Brigade, and occupied the ground. 

The day of the 10th was intensely hot, and the troops on both sides 
were too much fatigued to renew the action. My whole effective force 
on that day, exclusive of Banks' Corps, which was in no condition for 
service, was about 20,000 artillery and infantry, and about 2,000 cav- 



10 

airy — Gen. Buford, with the cavalry force under his command, not yet 
having been able to join the main body. I had telegraphed Gen. 
King at Fredericksburg to move forward on the 8th, by the lower 
fords of the Rappahannock and Steveosburg, to join nie. A large 
part of his command had just returned from a very fatiguing expedi- 
tion against the Central Kailroad, but he marched forward promptly 
and joined the main body late in the evening of the 11th. The whole 
day was spent by both armies in burying the dead and in bringing off 
the wounded. 

Although, even after King joined me, my whole effective force 
was barely equal to that of the enemy, I determined, after giving 
King's Division one night's rest, to fall upon him at daylight on the 
l-:th on his line of communications, and compel him to fight a battle, 
which must have been entirely decisive for one army or the other. 
But during the night of the 11th, Jackson evacuated the positions in 
front of us, and retreated rapidly across the Rapidan, in the direction 
of Gordousville, leaving many of his dead and wounded on the field 
and along the road from Cedar Mountain to Orange Court House. No 
material of war nor baggage trains were lost on either side, but the 
loss of lire on both sides was severe. Brig.-Gens. Geary, Auger and 
C.irrol were badly wounded, and Brig.-Gen. Prince was captured by 
accident. Very many of our best field and company officers were 
killed or wounded. From the verbal reports and statements of Gen. 
Banks and others, ihe Massachusetts regiments behaved with especial 
gallantry, and sustained the heaviest losses, but the conduct of the 
whole Cjrps of Gen. Banks was beyond all praise. 

Although I regret that Gen. Banks thought it expedient to depart 
from my instructions, it gives me pleasure to bear testimony to his 
gallant and intrepid conduct throughout the action. He exposed 
himself as freely as any one under his command, and his example 
went far to secure that gallant and noble conduct which has 
made his Corps famous. Generals AVilliams, Geary, Auger, Carroll, 
Gordon, Crawford and Green behaved with distinguished gallantry. 
Gen. Prince, who led his brigade throughout the action with 
coolness and courage, was captured after dark while passing from 
one portion of his command to the other. As I have not received 
any report from Gen. Banks, it is not in my power to mention the 
field and company officers who distinguished themselves under his 
immediate eye in action; but as soon as his report is received, I 
will transmit it to the Government, and endeavor to do justice to every 
officer and soldier who belonged to his Corps. Brig.-Gen. Roberts, 
Chief of Cavalry, of my Staff, accompanied Gen. Banks throughout 
the day, and rendered most important and gallant service. 

No report of killed and wounded has been made to me by Gen. 
Banks. I can, therefore, only form an approximation of our losses 
in that battle. Our killed, wounded and prisoners amounted to about 
1,800 men, besides which fully 1,000 men straggled back to Culpep- 
per Court House and beyond, and never entirely returned to their 
commands. 



11 

A strong Cavalry force, under Grens. Buford and Bayard, pursued 
the enemy to the llapidan, and captured many stragglers. The cav- 
alry forces immediately resumed their original position, and again 
occupied the llapidan from Raccoon Ford to the base of the Blue 
Ridge. On the 14th of August, Gen. Reno, with 8,000 men of the 
forces which had arrived at Falmouth under Gen. Burnside, joined 
me. I immediately pushed forward my whole force in the direction 
of the Rapidan, and occupied a strong position, with my right, under 
Maj.-Gen. Sigel, resting on Robertson's River, where the road frnm 
Cedar mountain to Orange Court House crosses that stream ; my cen- 
ter, under Gen. McDowell, occupied both flanks of Cedar Mountain ; 
and my left, under Gen. Reno, a position near Raccoon Ford, and 
covering the road from that ford to Stevensburg and Culpepper. I 
began again, immediately, to operate with my cavalry upon the ene- 
my's communications with Richmond. From the 12th to the ISth of 
August, reports were constantly reaching me of large forces of the 
enemy reinforcing Jackson from the direction of Richmond, and by the 
morning of the 18th, I became satisfied that nearly the whole force 
of the enemy from Richmond was assembling in my front, along the 
south side of the Rapidan, and extending from Raccoon Ford to Lib- 
erty Mills. The cavalry expedition sent out on the 16th, in the 
direction of Louisa Court House, captured the Adjutant-General ot 
General Stuart, and was very near capturing that officer himself. 
Among the papers taken was an autograph letter of Gen. Robert Lee 
to Gen. Stuart, dated Gordonsville, Aug. 15, which made manifest to 
me the position and force of the enemy, and their determination to 
overwhelm the army under my command before it could be reinforced 
by any portion of the Army of the Potomac. I held on to my posi- 
tion thus far to the front, for the purpose of affording all the time 
possible for the arrival of the Army of the Potomac at Aquia and 
Alexandria, and to embarrass and delay the movements of the enemy 
as far as practicable. 

On the 18th of August it became apparent to me that this ad- 
vanced position, with the small force under my command, was no 
longer tenable in the face of the overwhelming forces of the enemy. 
I determined, accordingly, to withdraw behind the Rappahannock with 
all speed, and, as I had been instructed, to defend, as far as practi- 
cable, the line of that river. I accordingly directed Maj.-Gen. Rena 
to send back his trains on the morning of the 18th, by the way of 
Stevensburg to Kelly's or Barnett's Ford, and as soon as the trains 
had gotten sevei'al hours in advance, to folluw them with his whole 
Corps, and take post behind the Rappahannock, leaving all his cavalry 
in the neighborhood of Raccoon Ford to cover this movement. Gen. 
Banks' Corps, which had been ordered on the 12th to take position at 
Culpepper Court House, I directed, with its trains preceding it, to 
cross the Rappahannock at the point where the Orange and Alexan- 
dria Railroad crosses that river; Gen. McDowell's train was ordered 
to pursue the same route; while the train of Gen. Sigel was directed 
through Jefferson to cross the Rappahannock at Warrenton, Sulphur 



12 

Springs. So soon as these trains had been sufficiently advanced, Mc- 
Dowell's Corps was directed to take the route from Culpepper to 
Rappahannock Ford, while G-en. Sigel, who was on the right and 
front, was directed to follow the movement of his train to Sulphur 
Springs. These movements were executed during the day and night 
of the 18th, and the day of the 19th, by which time the whole army 
with its trains had safely recrossed the Kappahannock and was posted 
behind that stream, with its left at Kelly's Ford, and its right about 
three miles above Rappahannock Station, Gen Sigel having been 
directed immediately upon crossing at Sulphur Springs to march down 
the left bank of the Rappahannock, until he connected closely with 
Gen. McDowell's right. 

Early in the morning of the 20th, the enemy drove in our pickets 
in front of Kelly's Ford, and at Rappahannock Station ; but, finding 
we had covered these fords, and that it would be impracticable to 
force the passage of the river without heavy loss, his advance halted, 
and the main body of his army was brought forward from the Rapidan. 
By the night of the 20th, the bulk of his forces confronted us from 
Kelly's Ford to a point above our extreme right. During the whole 
of the 21st and 22d, efforts were made by the enemy at various points 
to cross the river, but they were repulsed in all cases. The artillery 
firing was rapid and continuous during the whole of those days, and 
extended along the line of the river for seven or eight miles. Find- 
ing that it was not practicable to force the passage of the river in my 
front, the enemy began slowly to move up the river, for the purpose 
of turning our right. My orders required me to keep myself closely in 
communication with Fredericksburg, to which point the Army of the 
Potomac was being brought from the Peninsula, with the purpose of 
reinforcing me from that place by the line of the Rappahannock. 
My force was too small to enable me to extend my right further, 
without so weakening my line as to render it easy for the enemy to 
break through it at any point. I telegraphed again and again to 
Washington, representing this movement of the enemy toward my 
right, and the impossibility of my being able to extend my lines so 
as to resist it without abandoning my connections with i'redericks- 
burg. I was assured on the 21st, that if I would hold the line of the 
river two days longer, I should be so strongly reinforced as not only 
to be secure, but to be able to resume offensive operations ; but on the 
25th of August, the only forces that had joined me, or were in the 
neighborhood, were 2,500 men of the Pennsylvania Reserves, under 
Brig.-Gen. Reynolds, who had arrived at Kelly's Ford, and the 
Division of Gen. Kearney, 4,500 strong, which had i-eached Warren- 
ton Junction. 

The line of the Rappahannock is very week, and scarce opposes 
any considerable obstacle to the advance of an army. It is but a 
small stream above the forks, and can be crossed by good fords 
every mile or two of its whole length. The movement of the enemy 
toward my right occasioned me much uneasiness, in consequence 
of the instructions, which bound me to keep in close commu- 



13 

nication with Fredericksburg ; but I instructed G-en. Sigel, who 
occupied the right of my line, and who expressed great apprehension 
that his flank would be turned, and proposed to withdraw from his 
position toward the railroad, to stand firm and hold his ground, and to 
allow the enemy to cross at Sulphur Springs and develop himself on 
the road toward Warrenton ; that, as soon as any considerable force 
had crossed at that place, I would rapidly mass my army during the 
night and throw it upon any force of the enemy which attempted to 
march in the direction of Warrenton. The whole of the cavalry 
under Brig. -Gens. Buford and Bayard was pushed considerably to the 
right of Gen. Sigel, in the diiection of Fayetteville and Sulphur 
Springs, to watch the movements of the enemy in that direction, and 
to picket the river as far up as possible. Gen. Sigel was ordered, 
if any force of the enemy attempted to cross below Sulphur Springs, 
to march at once against it and to notify me, as I was determined to 
resist the passage of the river at any point below the Springs. Copies 
of my dispatches to the General-in-Chief, and of his replies, the 
dispatches from Gen. Sigel, and my orders to him given during the 
20th, 21st, 22d and 23d of August, are appended, which show com- 
pletely the condition of things, my understanding of the movements 
of the enemy, and the dispositions which I made and proposed to 
make in relation to them. 

Finding that the continued movement of the enemy to my right, 
while heavy masses of his force still confronted me at Rappahan- 
nock Station, would within a day, if allowed to continue, either 
render my position on the Bappahaanock wholly untenable, or force 
me to give battle to the enemy in my front and on my right, I 
determined, on the afternoon of the 22d, to mass my whole force, 
to recross the Rappahannock by the bridges and fords near Rap- 
pahannock Station, and by Kelly's Ford below, and to fall on the 
flank and rear of the long column of the enemy which was pas- 
sing up the river toward our right. I accordingly made the 
necessary orders on the night of the 22d of August. The attempt 
would have been dangerous, but no recourse was left me except to 
make this attack, to retire to Warrenton Junction and abandon the 
line of the Rappahannock, or to retire in the direction of Fredericks- 
burg, and abandon the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, and the 
direct approaches to Washington City. I determined, therefore, to 
hazard the result, and to fall furiously with my whole army on the 
flank and rear of the enemy. During the night of the 22d a heavy 
rain set in, which, before day dawned on the 23d, had caused the 
river to rise six or eight feet, carried away all our bridges, and des- 
troyed all the fords on the river. To recross the Rappahannock, and 
to make the attack as proposed, was no longer practicable ; but the 
rise in the river which had prevented this movement I believed would 
also prevent the retreat of that portion of the enemy which had 
crossed at Sulphur Springs and Waterloo Bridge, according to the 
reports which had been sent me by Gen. Sigel. 

Early on the morning of the 23d, therefore, I massed my whole 



14 

force in the neighborhood of Rappahannock Station , with the purpose 
of falling upon that portion of the enemy which had crossed above 
me, and was then supposed to be between Sulphur Springs, Waterloo 
Bridge and the town of Warrenton. As the river was too high 
to be crossed, and was likely to remain so for ar least thirty-six hours, 
I had no fear that the enemy would be able to interpose between me 
and Fredericksburg, or to make any attempt upon the Orange and 
Alexandria Railroad north of the Rappahannock. I directed Gen. 
Sigelto march with his whole Corps upon Sulphur Springs, supported 
by Reno's Corps and Banks' Corps, to fall upon anybody of the 
enemy that he might encounter, and to push forward along the river 
to Waterloo Bridge. I directed G-en, McDowell to move at the same 
time directly upon the town of Warrenton, so that from that point 
he would be able, if necessary, to unite with Gen. Sigel on the road 
from that place to Sulphur Springs, or to Waterloo Bridge. To the 
Corps of Gen. McDowell I had attached the Pennsylvania Reserves, 
under Brig.-Gen. Reynolds, the first of the Army of the Potomac 
that had joined my command. 

On the night of the 22d of August a small cavalry force of the 
enemy, crossing Waterloo Bridge and passing through Warrenton, 
made a raid upon our trains at Catlett's Station, and destroyed 
four or five wagons in all, belonging to the train of my own 
headquarters. At the time this cavalry force attacked at Catlett's, 
and it certainly was not more than three hundred strong, our whole 
army-trains were parked at that place, and were guarded by not less 
than fifteen hundred infantry and five companies of cavalry. The 
success of this small cavalry party of the enemy, although very 
trifling and attended with but little damage, was most disgraceful to 
the force which had been left in charge of the trains. 

Gen. Sigel moved as ordered, slowly up the Rappahannock, in the 
direction of Sulphur Springs, on the 23d, and first encountered a 
force of the enemy near the point where a small creek called "Great 
Run" puts into the Ptappahannock, about two miles below the Sul- 
phur Springs. The enemy was driven across the stream but destroyed 
the bridges. The heavy rains had caused this small creek to rise so 
much that it was not then fordable, so that the night of the 23d and 
part of the morning of the 2-l:th were spent by Gen. Sigel in 
rebuilding the bridges. On the night of the 2Bd, also, the advance 
of McDowell's Corps occupied Warrenton, a cavalry force of the 
enemy having retreated from there a few hours before. 

On the morning of the 24th, Gen. Sigel, supported by Gens. 
Reno and Banks, crossed Great Run aud occupied the Sulphur 
Springs, under a heavy fire of artillery from batteries which the enemy 
had established all along the south side of the Rappahannock, The 
bridge which had been built at Sulphur Springs, and upon which the 
forces of the eoemy which had crossed a day or two previous escaped 
from the advance of Gen. Sigel was destroyed, and Gen. Sigel pushed 
forward with the force supporting him, in the direction of Waterloo 
Bridge. 



15 

Meantime, I had dispatched Brig. -Gen. Buford with a heavy cav- 
alry force from Warrenton, on the morning of the 24th, to reconnoi- 
tre the country in the vicinity of Waterloo Bridge, and to interrupt 
the passage of the river at that point as far as possible. It was then 
believed by Gen. Sigel, who so reported to me, that a considerable 
force of the enemy was on the north side of the Rappahannock, and 
was retiring from his advance in the direction of Waterloo Bridge. 
By noon of the 24th Gen. Buford reported to me that he had occu- 
pied Waterloo Bridge, without finding any force of the enemy, and 
he did not believe that there was any force between that place and 
Sulphur Springs. I directed him to destroy the bridge at Waterloo, 
and to maintain his position until the arrival of the advance of Gen. 
Sigel. I at once informed Gen. Sigel of these facts, and directed him 
to push forward his advance to Waterloo. Milroy's Brigade, consti- 
tuting the advance of his Corps, reached Waterloo late in the aiter- 
noon of the 24th, On that afternoon the whole force of the enemy 
was stretched along the line of the river, from the Rappahannock 
Station to Waterloo Bridge, with his centre, and I think his main 
body, in the vicinity of Sulphur Springs. During the day of the 
24th, a large detachment of the enemy, numbering thirty-six regi- 
ments of infantry, with the usual number of batteries of artillery and 
a considerable cavalry force, marched rapidly to the north in the 
direction of Rectortowu. They could be plainly seen from our signal 
stations, established at high points along the Rappahannock; and 
their movements and force were reported to me from time to time by 
Col. J. S. Clark, of Gen. Banks' staiF, who, on that day,, and for 
many preceding and succeeding days, gave me most valuable and reli- 
able information. I am glad to express here my appreciation of the 
valuable services of this othcer. 

On the night of the 24th, my forces were distributed as follows : 
Ricketts' Division, of McDowell's Corps, on the road from Warrenton 
to Waterloo Bridge, and about four miles east of Waterloo; King's 
Division, of the same Corps, between Warrenton and the Sulphur 
Springs; Sigel's Corps, near the Rappahannock, with his advance 
at Waterloo Bridge, and his rear in the direction of Sulphur Springs. 
In his rear, and immediately in contact with him, was Banks' Corps; 
while Reno's Corps was east and very near the Sulphur Springs. 

I was satisfied that no force of the enemy was on the north side of 
the Rappahannock ; but I feared that during the nest day — by which 
time the river would have fallen sufficiently to be passable at any of 
the fords — the enemy would make an attempt to cross at Rappahan- 
nock Station, or at the fords between that point and Sulphur Springs. 
Yet, as we were confronted at Waterloo Bridge and Sulphur Springs 
by the main body of the enemy, still moving toward our right, and 
as the heavy column mentioned previously, was marching with all 
speed in the direction of White Plains and Salem, and from those 
points would be able to turn our right by the direction of Thorough- 
fare Gap, or even north of that place, it was with the greatest 
reluctance, and only because I felt bound to do so under my instruc- 



16 

tions, that I took measures again to assure my communications ■with 
Fredericksburg. I append herewith orders and dispatches sent and 
received during the 23d and 24th of August, which will of themselves 
furnish a succinct account of the movements here set forth, and all 
the information and assurances upon which those movements were 
made. 

On the 23d I received a dispatch from the General-in-Chief, 
informing me that heavy reinforcements would begin to arrive at 
Warrenton Junction the succeeding day, and on the 24th I received 
dispatches from Col. Haupt, the Railroad Superintendent at Alexan- 
dria, w^ho informed me that 30,000 men, ordered forward to join me, 
had demanded transportation from him, and that they would all be 
shipped that afternoon or early the next morning. The force which 
I thus expected was, as reported to me, to consist of the Division 
of Gen. Sturgis, 10,000 strong; the Division of Gen. Cox, 7,000 
strong; the Corps of Gen. Heintzelman, 10,000 strong; and the 
Corps of Gen. Franklin, 10,000 strong. I3y the night of the 25th it 
became apparent to me that I could no longer keep open my commu- 
nications with Fredericksburg, and oppose the crossing of the Eappa- 
hannock, at Rappahannock Station, without abandoning the road from 
Warrenton to Washington, and leaving open to the enemy the route 
through Thoroughftire Gap, and all other roads north of the Orange 
and Alexandria Railroad. As the main body of his force was con- 
stantly tending in that direction, I determined no longer to attempt to 
mask the lower fords of the Rappahannock, but to assemble such 
forces as I had along the Warrenton Turnpike, between Warrenton 
and Gainesville, and give battle to the enemy on my right or left, as 
he might choose. I therefore directed McDowell to occupy Warren- 
ton with his own and Sigel's Corps, supporting him by Banks' Corps 
from the direction of Fayetteville. I pushed Reno forward to occupy 
a point near the Warrenton turnpike, and about three miles to the 
east of that town. I sent orders to Geu. Porter, who had reported to me 
by note from the neighborhood of Bealeton Station, to push forward 
and join Reno. Heintzelman's Corps, which had reached Warrenton 
Junction, was ordered to remain for the present at that point, it being 
my purpose to push forward that Corps, as soon as practicable, to 
Greenwich, about half way between Warrenton and Gainesville. I 
sent orders to Col. Haupt to direct one of the strongest Divisions 
being sent forward to take post in the works at Manassas Junction, 
and requested Gen. Halleck to push Franklin with all speed to 
Gainesville; that he could march quite as rapidly as he could be 
transported by rail, with the limited means of railroad transportation 
in our possession, and that his baggage and supplies could be sent 
forward to Gainesville by rail. I also sent orders to the Colonel com- 
manding at Manassas Junction, for the first Division that reached 
there from Alexandria to halt and take post in the works at that 
place, and directed him to push forward all of his cavalry in the 
direction of Thoroughfare Gap, to watch any movements the ene- 
my might make from that direction. I had instructed Gen. Sturges, 



17 

commanding at Alexandria, on the 22d of August, to post strong 
guards along the Railroad from Manassas Junction to Catlett's Sta- 
tion, and requested him to superintend this in person. I also directed 
Gen. Kearney, who reached Warrenton Junction on the 23d, to see 
that sufficient guards were placed all along the railroad in his rear. 
After these precautions and assurances, I had thought and confidently 
expected that by the afternoon of the 26th, Franklin would have 
been at or near Gainesville ; one Division would have been occupying 
the works at Manassas Junction ; and that the forces under Sturgis 
and Cox would have been at Warrenton Junction, whence they could at 
once have been pushed north in the direction of Warrenton Turnpike 
The orders for the disposition of the forces under my command were 
sent, and the movements made, so far as practicable, durino: the day of 
the 26th. 

About 8 o'clock at night on the 26th, the advance of Jackson's 
force having passed through Thoroughfare Gap, cut the railroad 
in the neighborhood of Kettle Run, about six miles east of Warren- 
ton Junction. The cavalry force which I had sent forward to 
Thoroughfare Gap on the morning of the 26th made no report to me. 
The moment our communications were interrupted at Kettle Run, I 
was satisfied that the troops which had been promised me from the 
direction of Washington, had made no considerable progress. Had 
Franklin been even at Centreville on the 26th, or had Cox and Stur- 
gis been as far west as Bull Run on that day, the movement of Jackson 
through Thoroughfare Gap upon the railroad at Manassas would have 
been utterly impracticable. So confidently did I expect, from the 
assurances which I had time and again received, that these troops 
would be in position, or at all events, so far advanced toward me, that 
Jackson's movement toward White Plains and in the direction of 
Thoroughfare Gap, had caused but little uneasiness ; but on the night 
of the 26th it was very apparent to me that all these expected rein- 
forcements had utterly tailed me ; and that upon the small force under 
my own immediate command, I must depend alone for any present 
operations against the enemy. 

It was easy for me to retire in the direction of the lower fords of 
the Rappahannock to Fredericksburg, so as to bring me in imme- 
diate contact with the forces there or arriving there; but by so doing 
I should have left open the whole front of Washington ; and after 
my own disappointment of the reinforcements which I had expected, 
I was not sure that there was any sufficient force, in the absence of 
the army under my comm ind, to cover the Capital. I determined, 
therefore, at once to abandon the line of the Rappahannock, and 
throw my whole force in the direction of Gainesville and Manassas 
Junction, to crush the enemy who had passed through Thoroughfare 
Gap, and to interpose between the army of Gen. Lee and Bull Run. 
During the night of the 26th the main body of the enemy still occu- 
pied their positions from Sulphur Springs to Waterloo Bridge and 
above ; but toward morning on the 27th, I think their advance moved 
oflF in the direction of White Plains, pursuing the route previously 
3 



18 

taken by Jacksou, and, no doubt, with a view of tiniting with him 
eastward of the Bull llun range. 

From the 18th of August, uotil the morning of the 27th, the troops 
under my command had been continuously marching and fighting 
night and day, and during the whole of that time there was scarcely 
an interval of an hour without the roar of artillery. The men had 
had but little sleep, were greatly worn down with fatigue, had had 
little time to get proper food or to eat it, had been engaged in con- 
stant battles and skirmishes, and had performed services, laborious, 
dangerous and excessive, beyond any previous experience in this 
country. As was to be expected, under such circumstances, the num- 
bers of the army under my command had been greatly reduced by 
death, by wounds, by sickness and by fatigue, so that on the morning 
of tlie 27th of August, I estimated my whole effective force (and I 
think the estimate was large) as follows: Sigel's Corps, 9,000, Banks' 
Corps, 5,000; McDowell's Corps, including Reynold's Division, 
15,500; Reno's Corps, 7,000; the Corps of Heintzelman and Porter 
(the freshest, by far, in that army) about 18,000 men, making in all 
54,500 men. Our cavalry numbered, on paper, about 4,000; but 
their horses were completely broken down, and there were not 500 
men, all told, capable of doing such service as should be expected from 
cavalry. The Corps of Heintzelman had reached Warrenton Junc- 
tion, but without wagons, without artillery, and with only forty rounds 
of ammunition to the man, and without even horses for the general 
and field oflacers. The Corps of Porter had also reached Warrenton 
Junction, with a very small supply of provisions, and but forty rounds 
of ammunition for each man. 

On the morning of the 27th, in accordance with the purpose pre- 
viously set forth, 1 directed McDowell to move forward rapidly on 
Gaioesville, by the Warrenton Turnpike, with his own Corps, and 
Sigel's, ind the Division of Reynolds', so as to reach that point 
during the night. I directed Gen. Reno, with his Corps, followed 
by Kearney's Division of Heintzelman's Corps, to move rapidly on 
Greenwich, so as to reach there that night; to communicate at once 
with Gen. McDowell, and to support him in any operations against 
the enemy in the vicinity of Gainesville. I moved forward along the 
railroad toward Manassas Junction with Hooker's Division of Heintz- 
elman's Corps, leaving orders for Gen. Porter to remain with his 
Corps at Warrenton Junction until relieved by Gen. Banks, who was 
marching to that place from Fayetteville, and as soon as he was re- 
lieved to push forward also in the direction of Gainesville, where, 
at that time, I expected that the main collision with the enemy would 
occur. 

The army trains of all the Corps I instructed to take the road to 
Warrenton Junction, and follow in the rear of Hooker's Division to- 
ward Manassas Junction, so that the road pursued by the trains was 
entirely covered from any possible interruption by the enemy. On 
the afternoon of the 27th a severe engagement occurred between 
Hooker's Division and Ewell's Division of Jackson's forces. The 



19 

action commenced about four miles west of Bristow Station. Ewell 
was driven back along the railroad, but still confronted Hooker at 
dark along the banks of Broad Run, immediately in front of Bristow 
Station, at which point I arrived at sunset. The loss in this engage- 
ment was about three hundred killed and wounded on each side, the 
enemy leaving his dead, many of his wounded and much of his bag- 
gage on the field of battle. 

The railroad had been torn up and the bridges burned in several 
places between Bristow Station and Warrenton Junction. I accord- 
ingly directed Maj.-Gen. Banks to cover the railroad trains at War- 
renton Junction until Gen. Porter's Corps had marched from that 
place, and then to run back the trains as far as practicable, and, cov- 
ering them with his troops, to repair the bridges as fast as possible. 
I also directed Capt. Merrill, of the engineers, with a considerable 
force, to repair the railroad track and bridges as far as possible in the 
direction of Bristow Station. The road was accordingly put in order 
from Warrenton Junction to Kettle Run, during the 27th, and the 
trains ran back to that point early next day. At dark on the 27th 
Clen. Hooker reported to me that his ammunition was nearly exhausted, 
that he Uad but five rounds to a man left. I had by that time become 
convinced that the whole force under Jackson, consisting of his own, 
A. P. Hill's and Ewell's Divisions, was south of the turnpike, and in 
the immediate neighborhood of Manassas Junction. 

G-en. McDowell reached his position during the night of the 27th, 
as did also Kearney and Reno, and it was clear on that night that we 
had interposed completely between Jackson and the main body of the 
enemy, which was still west of the Bull Run range, and in the neigh- 
borhood of White Plains. Thinking it altogether likely that Jackson 
would mass his whole force and attempt to turn our right at Bristow 
■Station, and knowing that Hooker, for want of ammunition, was in 
little condition to make long resistance, I sent back orders to Gen. Por- 
ter, about dark of the 27th, to move forward at 1 o'clock in the niglit, 
and report to me at Bristow by daylight in the morning, leaving instruc- 
tions in some detail for Banks, who was expected at Warrenton Junction 
during that night or early in the morning. The orders for all these 
movements are herewith appended. Gen. Porter failed utterly to obey 
the orders that were sent to him ; giving as an excuse that his men 
were tired, that they would straggle in the night, and that a wagon 
train, proceeding eastward, in the rear of Hooker's Division, would 
ofier obstructions to his march. He, however, made no attempt what- 
ever to comply with this order, although it was stated to him in the 
order itself that his presence was necessary on all accounts at daylight, 
and that the officer delivering the despatch was instructed to conduct 
him to the field. 

There were but two courses left open to Jackson in consequence of 
this sudden and unexpected movement of the army. He could not 
retrace his steps through Gainesville, as it was occupied by McDow- 
ell, having at command a force equal, if not superior to his own. He 
was either obliged therefore to retreat through CentrevilJe, which 



20 

would carry him still further from the main body of Lee's army, or, 
to mass his forces, assault us at Bristow Station, and turn our right. 
He pursued the former course, and retired through Centreville. This 
mistake of Jackson's alone saved us from the serious consequences 
which would have followed this disobedience of orders on the part of 
Gen. Porter. 

At nine o'clock on the night of the 27th, satisfied of Jackson's po- 
sition, I sent orders to Gen. McDowell to push forward at the very 
earliest dawn of day, toward Manasses Junction from Gainesville, rest- 
ing his right on the Manassas Gap Railroad, and throwing his 
left well to the east. I directed Gen. Reno to march at the same 
hour from Greenwich, direct upon Manasses Junction, and Kearney 
to march at the same hour upon Bristow. This latter order was sent 
to Kearney to render my right at Bristow perfectly secure against the 
probable movement of Jackson in that direction. Kearney arrived 
at Bristow about 8 o'clock in the morning. Reno being on the left, 
and marching direct upon Manasses Junction. I immediately pushed 
Kearney forward in pursuit of Ewell, toward Manassas, followed by 
Hooker. Gen. Porter's Corps did not arrive at Bristow until half-past 
ten o'clock in the morning ; and the moment he found that Jackson 
had evacuated Manasses Junction, he requested permission to halt at 
Bristow, and rest his men. Syke's division of Porter's Corps, had 
spent the whole day of the 27th, from 10 o'clock in the morning, un- 
til daylight of the 28th, in camp at Warrenton Junction. Morrell's 
Division of the same Corps had arrived at Warrenton Junction du- 
ring the day of the 27th, and also remained there during the whole 
of that night. Porter's Corps was by far the freshest in the whole 
army, and should have been, and, I believe, was, in better condition 
for service than any troops we had. 

Gen. McDowell reported to me afterwards, that he had given 
orders for the movement of his command upon Manassas Junction 
at 2 o'clock at night, in accordance with the directions I had sent 
him, but that Gen. Sigel, who commanded his advance, and was 
at Gainesville, instead of moving forward from Gainesville at day- 
light, as he was ordered, was absolutely with his advance in that 
town as late as 7^^ o'clock in the morning. Meantime, beginning 
about 3 o'clock in the morning of the 28th, Jackson commenced 
evacuating Manassas Junction, and his troops were marching from 
that point in the direction of Centreville, until 10 or 11 o'clock in 
the day. If the whole force under McDowell had moved forward as 
directed, and at the time specified, they would have intercepted Jack- 
son's retreat toward Centreville by 8 o'clock in the morning, and I do 
not believe it would have been possible for Jackson to have crossed 
Bull Run, so closely engaged with our forces, without heavy loss. 
[See McDowell's report concerning the delay of Gen. Sigel.] 

I reached Manassas Junction with Kearney's Division and Reno's 
Corps about 12 o'clock on the day of the 28th, less than an hour after 
Jackson in person had retired. I immediately pushed forward Hook- 
er, Kearney, and Reno upon Centreville, and sent orders to Fitz John 



21 

Porter to come forward to Manassas Junction. I also wrote to Mc- 
Dowell, and stated the facts so far as we were then able to ascertain 
them, and directed him to call back the whole of his force, that had 
come in the direction of Manassas Junction, and to move forward up- 
on Centreville. He had, however, without my knowledge, detached 
Ricketts' Division in the direction of Thoroughfire Gap, and that 
Division was no longer available in his movement towards Centreville. 

Late in the afternoon of the 28th, Kearney drove the enemy's rear 
guard out of Centreville, and occupied tli^t town, with his advance be- 
yond it, about dark. The enemy retreated through Centreville, one 
portion of his force taking the road by Sudley Springs, and the other 
pursuing the Warrenton turnpike toward Gainesville, destroying the 
bridges on that road, over Bull Run and Cub Run ; McDowell, with 
his whole force, consisting of his own Corps, (except Ricketts' Divis- 
ion,) Sigel's Corps, and the Division of Reynolds, marching in the 
direction of Centreville, encountered the advance of Jackson's force 
retreating toward Thoroughfare Gap, about C o'clock on the evening 
of the 28tli. A severe action took place between King's Division, of 
McDowell's Corps, and the advance of Jackson, which was terminat- 
ed by darkness. Each party mnintained its ground. Gibbons' Bri- 
gade, of King's Division, which was in the advance of that Division, 
sustained the brunt of the action, but was supported handsomely by 
Doubleday's Brigade, which came into action shortly after. This en- 
gagement and its result, were reported to me near Centreville, about 
10 o'clock that night. 

I felt sure then, and so stated, that there was no escape for Jack- 
son. I accordingly sent orders to Gen. McDowell, as also to Gen. 
King, several times during the night of the 29th, and once by his 
own Staff officer, to hold his ground at all hazards, and prevent the 
retreat of Jackson to the West, and that at daylight in the morning 
our whole force from Centreville and Manassas Junction would be up 
with the enemy, who must be crushed between us. I also sent orders 
to Gen. Kearney to push forward at 1 o'clock that night cautiously 
from Centreville along the Warrenton Turnpike, to drive in the pick- 
ets of the enemy, and to keep closely in contact with him during the 
night; to rest his left on the Warrenton Turnpike, and throw his right 
well to the north, if possible across Little River Turnpike; at day- 
light in the morning to assault vigorously with his right advance; and 
that Hooker and Reno would be up with him very shorily after day- 
dawn. I sent orders to Gen. Porter, whom I supposed to be at 
Manassas Junction, where he should have been, in compliance with 
my orders of the day previous, to move upon Centreville at the earli- 
est dawn, and stated to him the position of the forces, and that a 
severe battle would undoubtedly be fought during the morning of the 
29th. The only apprehension I had at that time was, that Jackson 
might attempt to retreat to the north in the direction of Leesburg, 
and for the purpose of preventing this, I directed Kearney to keep 
closely in contact with, him during the whole of the night of the 28th. 
My force was so disposed that McDowell, Sigel and Reynolds, whose 



22 

joint forces amounted to about 25,000 men, were immediately west of 
Jackson, and between him and Thoroughfare Gap, while Kearney, 
Hooker, Reno and Porter, about 25,0(J0 strong, were to fall on 
him from the east at daylight in the morning, or very shortly after. 
With this disposition of troops we were so far in advance of Long- 
street, that by using our whole force vigorously, we should be able to 
crush Jackson before Longstreet could by any possibility reach the 
scene of action. 

To my great disappointment, however, I learned, toward daylight, 
on the morning of the 29th, that King's Division had fallen back in 
the direction of iManassas Junction, thus leaving open the road to 
Thoroughfare Grap, and making new movements and dispositions of 
troops immediately necessary. 

I submit herewith the reports of Gens. King, Gibbon and Double- 
day, of the action of the evening of the 28th, as also a detailed report 
of Gen. McDowell. The orders directing all these movements are 
also appended, and they bring the operations of the army up to the 
29th of August. 

The losses in King's Division, in the action of the evening of the 
28th, were principally in Gibbon's Brigade of that Division, and 
numbered . 

Gibbon's Brigade consisted of some of the best troops in the ser- 
vice, and the conduct of both men and officers was gallant and distin- 
guished. The report of Gen. King, herewith appended, exhibits 
his high opinion of the conduct of this Brigade, and of the officers 
who distinguished themselves in that action. 

The disposition of the troops on the west of Jackson having failed 
through Ricketts' movement toward Thoroughfare Gap, and the con- 
sequent withdrawal of King, an immediate change in the disposition 
and proposed movements of the troops for the succeeding day became 
necessary; and about daylight on the morning of the 29th, shortly 
after I received information of the withdrawal of King's Division, I 
sent orders to Gen. Sigel, who was in the neighborhood of Groveton, 
supported by Reynolds' Division, to attack the enemy vigorously as 
soon as it was light enough to see and bring him to a stand, if it were 
possible for him to do so. I instructed Gen. Heintzelman to push 
forward from Centreville toward Gainesville at the earliest dawn, with 
the Divisions of Hooker and Kearney, and directed Gen. Reno to fol- 
low closely in his rear, to use all speed, and as soon as they came up 
with the enem}'- to establish communication with Sigel, and attack 
with the utmost promptness and vigor. I also sent orders to Maj.- 
Gen. B'itz John Porter, at Manassas Junction, to move forward with 
the utmost rapidity, with his own Corps and King's Division of Mc- 
Dowell's Corps, which was supposed to be at that point, upon Gaines- 
ville, by the direct road from Manassas Junction to that place. I 
urged him to make all speed, that he might come up with the enemy 
and be able to turn his flank near where the Warrenton Turnpike is 
intersected by the road from Manassas Junction to Gainesville. 
Shortly after sending this order, I received a note from Gen. McDow- 



23 

ell, whom I had not been able to find during the night of the 28th, 
dated at Manassas Junction, requesting that King's Division might 
not be taken from his command, I immediately sent a joint order to 
Gens. McDowell and Porter, directing them, with their two Corps, to 
march with all speed toward Gainesville, on the direct road from Ma- 
nassas Junction. This ordcr^ which is appended, sets forth in detail 
the movements they were directed to make. 

Sigel attacked the enemy about daylight on the morning of the 
29th, a mile or two east of Groveton, where he was soon joined 
by the Divisions of Hooker and Kearney. Jackson fell back several 
miles, but was so closely pressed by thesj forces that he was com- 
pelled to make a stand, and to make the best defense possible. 
He accordingly took up a position with his left in the neighbor- 
hood of Sudley Springs, his right a little to the south of Warren- 
ton Turnpike, and his line covered by an old railroad grade which 
leads from Gainesville in the direction of Leesburg. His batteries, 
which were numerous, and some of them of heavy calibre, were 
posted behind the ridges in the open ground on both sides of War- 
rentou Turnpike, while the mass of his troops was sheltered in dense 
woods behind the railroad embankment. 

I arrived on the field from Centreville about noon, and found the 
two armies confronting each other, both considerably cut up by the 
sharp action in which they had been engaged since daylight in the 
morning. Heintzelman's corps occupied the right of our line, in 
front or west of the Sudley Springs road. Gen. Sigel was on his left, 
with his line extended a short distance south of the Warrenton Turn- 
pike ; the division of Gen. Schenck occupying the high ground to 
the left of the road. The extreme left was occupied by Gen. Rey- 
nolds. Gen. Reno's Corps had reached the field, and the most of it 
had been pushed forward into action, leaving four regiments in re- 
serve, and in rear of the centre of our line. Immediately after I 
reached the ground, Gen. Sigel reported to me that his line was weak; 
that the divisions of Schurz and Steinwehr were much cut up, and 
ought to be drawn back from the front. I informed Gen. Sigel that 
this was utterly impossible, as there were no troops to replace them, 
and that he must hold his ground ; that I would not again push his 
troops into action, as the Corps of Porter and McDowell were moving 
forward from Manassas Junction, on the road to Gainesville, and must 
very soon be in position to fall upon the enemy's right flank, and prob- 
ably upon his rear I rode to the front of our line, and inspected it 
from right to left, giving the same information to Gens. Heintzelman 
and Reno. The troops were accordingly sufiered to rest in their posi- 
tions, and to re-supply themselves with ammunition. From 12 until 
4 o'clock very severe skirmishes occurred constantly at various points 
on our line, and were brought on at every indication the enemy made 
of a disposition to retreat. 

About two o'clock in the afternoon several pieces of artillery were 
discharged on the extreme right of the enemy's line, and I fully 
believed that Gens. Porter and McDowell had reached their posi- 



24 

tions, and had become engaged with the enemy. I did not hear 
more than three shots fired, and was at a loss to know what had 
become of those two Corps, or what was delaying them, but I 
received information shortly afterward, that Gen. McDowell was ad- 
vancing to join the main body by the Sudley Springs road, and would 
probably be up with us in two hours. At half-past 4 o'clock, I sent 
a peremptory order to Gen. Porter to push forward at once, into 
action on the enemy's right, and if possible to turn his rear, stating to 
him generally, the condition of things on the field in front of me. About 
5^ o'clock, when Geo. Porter should have been coming into action in 
compliance with this order, I directed Gens. Heintzelman and lieno 
to attack the enemy. The attack was made with great gallantry, and 
the whole of the left of the enemy was doubled back toward his cen- 
tre, and our own forces, after a sharp conflict of an hour and a half, 
occupied the field of battle, with the dead and wounded of the enemy in 
our hands. In this attack, Grover's brigade of Hooker's Division 
was particularly distinguished by a determined bayonet charge, break- 
ing two of the enemy's lines, and penetrating to the third before it 
could be checked. By this time Gen. McDowell had arrived on the 
field, and I pushed his Corps immediately to the front, along the War- 
renton turnpike, with orders to fall upon the enemy, who was retreat- 
ing towards the pike from the direction of Sudley Springs. The attack 
along the turnpike was made by King's Division at about sunset in the 
evening ; but by that time the advance of the main body of the enemy 
under Longstreet, had begun to reach the field, and King's Division 
encountered a stubborn and determined resistance at a point about 
three-fourths of a mile in front of our line of battle. 

^Vhile this attack was going on, the forces of Heintzelman and 
lleno continued to push back the left of the enemy in the direction of 
Warrcnton Turnpike, so that about 8 o'clock in the evening the 
greater portion of the field of battle was occupied by our army. No- 
thing was heard of Gen. Porter up to that time, and his forces took no 
part whatever in the action, but were sufiered by him to lie idle on 
their arms, within sight and sound of the battle during the whole 
day. So far as I know, he made no effort whatever to comply with 
my orders or to take any part in the action. I do not hesitate to say 
that if he had discharged his duty as became a soldier under the cir- 
cumstances, and had made a vigorous attack on the enemy as he was ex- 
pected and directed to do, at any time up to 8 o'clock that night, we 
should have utterly crushed or captured the larger portion of Jack- 
son's force before he could have been by any possibility sufficiently 
reinforced to liave made an effective resistance. I did not myself feel 
for a moment that it was necessary for me, having given Gen. Porter 
an order to march toward the enemy, in a particular direction, to send 
him in addition specific orders to attack, it being his clear duty, and 
in accordance with every military precept, to have brought his forces 
into action wherever he encountered the enemy, when a furious battle 
with that enemy was raging during the whole day in his immediate 
presence. I believe, in fact I am positive, that at 5 o'clock on the 



26 

afternoon of the 29tli, Gren. Porter had in his front no considerable 
body of the enemy. I beUeved then, as I am very sure now, that 
it was easily practicable ior him to have turned the right flank of 
Jackson, and to have fallen upon his rear ; that if he had done so, 
we should have gained a decisive victory over the army under Jack- 
son before he could have been joined by any of the forces of Long- 
street, and that the army of G-en. Lee would have been so crippled 
and checked by the destruction of this large force as to have been no 
longer in condition to prosecute further operations of an aggressive 
character. 

Our losses during the 29th were very heavy, but no separate return 
of killed and wounded for that day have been made to me. I believe, 
from all I could learn from Corps commanders, and so, reported, that 
our loss during that day was not less than six or eight thousand killed 
and wounded, and I think the estimate will be confirmed by the gen- 
eral reports, which cover the losses during the battles of the 27th, 
28th, 29th and 30th August, and the 1st of September. My estimate 
of the loss of the enemy, reported to the Department on the morning 
of the 30th, was based upon the statements made to me by Gens. 
Hooker and Kearney, who had been over the whole field on the left. 
G-en. Hooker estimated the loss of the enemy as at least two to one, 
and Gen. Kearney as at least three to one of our own. 

Every indication, during the night of the 29th and up to 10 o'clock 
on the morning of the 30th, pointed to the retreat of the enemy from 
our front. Paroled prisoners of our own, taken on the evening of 
the 29th, and who came into our lines on the morning of the oOth, 
reported the enemy retreating during the whole night in the direc- 
tion of and along the Warrenton Turnpike. Gens. McDowell and 
Heintzelman, who reconnoitred the positions held by the enemy's left 
on the evening of the 29th, confirmed this statement. They reported 
to me that the positions occupied by the enemy's left had been evacu- 
ated, and that there was every indication that he was retreating in the 
direction of G-ainesville. 

On the morning of the 30th, as may be supposed, our troops, who 
had been so continually marching and fighting for so many days, were 
in a state of great exhaustion. They had had little to eat for two 
days previous, and artillery and cavalry horses had been in harness 
and saddled continuously for ten days, and had had no forage for two 
days previous. It may easily be imagined how little these troops, after 
such severe labors, and after undergoing such hardships and privation, 
were in condition for active and efficient service. I had telegraphed 
to the General-in-Chief on the 28th our condition, and had begged of 
him to have rations and forage sent forward to us from Alexandria 
with all dispatch. I informed him of the imminent need of cavalry 
horses to enable the cavalry belonging to the army to perform any 
service whatever. About daylight of the 30th I received a note from 
Gen. Franklin — herewith appended — written by direction of Gen. 
McClellan, and dated at 8 o'clock p. m. on the 29th, informing me 
that rations and forage would be loaded into the available wagons and 
4 



26 

cars at Alexandria, as soon as I would send back a cavalry escort to 
bring out the trains. Such a letter, when we were fighting the enemy, 
and Alexandria was swarming with troops, needs no comment. Bad 
as was the condition of our cavalry, I was in no situation to spare 
troops from the front, nor could they have gone to Alexandria and 
returned within the time by which we must have had provisions or 
have fallen back in the direction of Washington. Nor do I yet 
see what service cavalry could have rendered in guarding railroad 
trains. It was not until I received this letter that I began to feel 
discouraged and nearly hopeless of any successful issue to the opera- 
tions with which I was charged; but Ifelt it to be my duty, notwith- 
standing the desperate condition of my command, from great 
fatigue, from want of provisions and forage, and from the small 
hope that I had of any efiective assistance from Alexandria, to 
hold my position at all hazards and under all privations, unless over- 
whelmed by the superior forces of the enemy. I had received no 
sort of information of any troops coming forward to my assistance 
since the 24th, and did not expect, on the morning cf the 30th, that 
any assistance would reach me from the direction of Washington; 
but I determined again to give battle to the enemy on the 30th, and 
at least to lay on such blows as would cripple him as much as possi- 
ble, and delay as long as practicable any further advance toward the 
Capital. I accordingly prepared to renew the engagement. 

At that time my eft'ective forces, greatly reduced by losses in killed, 
wounded, missing and broken down men, during the severe operations of 
the two or three days and nights previous ; the sharp actions of Hooker, 
King and Ricketts on the 27th and 28th, and the furious battle on the 
29th, were estimated by me and others as follows : McDowell's 
Corps, including Reynolds' Division, 12,000 men ; Sigel's Corps, 
7,000; Reno's Corps 7,000; Heintzelman's Corps 7,000; Porter's 
Corps, which had been in no engagement, and was, or ought to have 
been, perfectly fresh, I estimated at about 12,000 men, including the 
Brigade of Piatt, which formed a part of Sturgis' Division, and the 
only portion that ever joined me. But of this force the Brigades of 
Piatt and GriflSn, numbering, as I understood, about 5,000 men had 
been suffered to march off at daylight on the 30th for Centreville, 
and were not available for operations on that day. This reduced 
Porter's effective force in the field to about 7,000 men, which "gave 
me a total force of 40,000 men. Banks' Corps, about 5,000 strong, 
was at Bristow Station, in charge of the railroad trains, and of a por- 
tion of the wagon trains of the army, still at that place. 

Between 12 and 2 o'clock in the day I advanced the Corps of Por- 
ter, supported by King's Division of McDowell's Corps, to attack the 
enemy along the Warrenton Turnpike ; at the same time I directed 
Heintzelman and Reno, on our right, to push forward to the left and 
front toward Warrenton Turnpike, and attack the enemy's left in flank 
if possible. For a short time Ricketts' Division of McDowell's Corps 
was placed in support of this movement on our right. 

It was necessary for me to act thus promptly, and make the attack, 



27 

as I had not tlie time, for want of provisions and forage, to await an 
attack from the enemy, nor did I think it poUcy to so do under the cir- 
cumstances. During the whole night of the 29th, and the morning of 
the 30th, the advance^of the main army, under Lee, was arriving on 
the field to reinforce Jackson, so that by 12 or 1 o'clock in the day, 
we were confronted by forces greatly superior to our own ; and these 
forces were being every moment largely increased by fresh arrivals of 
the enemy from the direction of Thoroughfare Gap. Every moment 
of delay increased the odds against us, and I therefore advanced to 
the attack as rapidly as I was able to bring my forces into action. 
Shortly after Gen. Porter moved forward to the attack by the War- 
renton Turnpike, and the assault on the enemy was begun by Heintz- 
elman and Keno on the right, it became apparent that the enemy 
was massing his troops, as fast as they arrived on the field, on his right 
and was moving forward from that direction to turn our left ; at which 
point it was plain he intended to make his main attack. I according- 
ly directed Gen. McDowell to recall Ricketts' Division immediately 
from our right, and post it on the left of our line. The attack of 
Porter was neither vigorous nor persistent, and his troops soon retired 
in considerable confusion. As soon as they commenced to fall back, 
the enemy advanced to the assault, and our whole line, from right to 
left, was soon furiously engaged. The main attack of the enemy was 
made upon our left, but was met with stubborn resistance by the 
Divisions of Gen. Schenck, Gen. Milroy and Gen. Reynolds, who, 
shortly after the action began, were reinforced on the left and rear 
by the whole of Ricketts' Division. The action raged furiously for 
several hours, the enemy bringing up his heavy reserves, and pouring- 
mass after mass of his troops upon our left. So greatly superior in 
number were his forces, that, while overpowering us on our left, he 
was able to assault us also with superior forces on our right. Porter's 
-forces were rallied and brought to a halt as they were retiring to the 
rear. As soon as they could be used, I pushed them forward to sup- 
port our left, and they there rendered distinguished service, especially 
the Brigade of regulars under Col. Buchanan. 

Tower's Brigade of Ricketts' Division was pushed forward into ac- 
tion in support of Reynolds' Division, and was led forward in person 
by Gen. Tower with conspicuous skill and gallantry. The conduct of 
that Brigade, in plain view of all the forces on our left, was especially 
distinguished, and drew forth hearty and enthusiastic cheers. The 
example of this Brigade was of great service, and infused new spirit 
into all the troops who witnessed its intrepid conduct. Reno's Corps 
was also withdrawn from its position on our right centre late in the 
afternoon, and was thrown into action on our left, where it behaved 
with conspicuous gallantry. 

Notwithstanding these great disadvantages, our troops held their 
ground with the utmost firmness and obstinacy. The loss on both 
sides was very heavy. By dark our left had been forced back about 
half or three-quarters of a mile, but still remained firm and unbroken, 
and still covered the turnpike in our rear. 



28' 

About 6 o'clock in the afternoon I heard accidentally that Frank- 
lin's Corps had arrived at a point about four miles east of Centreville, 
and twelve miles in our rear, and that it was only about 8,000 strong. 

The result of the battle of the 30th, the very heavy losses we had 
suffered, and the complete prostration of our troops from hunger and 
fatigue, made it plain to me that we were no longer able, in the face 
of such overwhelming odds, to maintain our position so far to the 
front ; nor could we have been able to do so under any circumstances, 
suffering, as were the men and horses from fatigue and hunger, and 
weakened by the heavy losses incident to the uncommon hardships 
whicli they had suffered. 

About eight o'clock at night, therefore, I sent written instructions 
to the commanders of Corps to withdraw leisurely towards Centreville, 
and stated to them what route each should pursue, and where they 
should take post. Gen. Reno was instructed, with his whole Corps, 
to cover the movement of the army toward Centreville. The with- 
drawal was made slowly, quietly and in good order, no pursuit what- 
ever having been attempted by the enemy. A division of infantry, 
with its batteries, was posted to cover the crossing at Cub Run. 

The exact losses in this battle I am unable to give, as the reports 
received from the Corps commanders only exhibit the aggregate losses 
during the whole of the operations from August 22d to September 
2d. Before leaving the field that night, I sent orders to Gen. Banks, 
at Bristow Station, to destroy the railroad trains and such of the 
stores in them as he was unable to carry off, and join me at Centre- 
ville. I had previously sent him orders to throw into each wagon of 
the army trains as much as possible of the stores from the railroad 
cars, and to be sure and bring off with him, from Warrenton Junc- 
tion and Bristow Station, all the ammunition, and all the sick and 
wounded that could be transported, and for this purpose, if it were 
necessary, to throw out the personal baggage, tents, &c., from the reg- 
imental trains. These several orders are appended. At no time dur- 
ing August 28, 29, 30 and 31, was the road between Bristow Station 
and Centreville interrupted by the enemy. The whole of the trains 
of the army were on that road, in charge of Gen. Banks, and covered 
and protected by his whole Corps. If any of these wagons were lost, 
as I believe none were, it was wholly without necessity. I enter thus 
specifically into this matter, and submit the orders sent to Gen. Banks, 
and his subsequent report to me, because no part of the misrepresen- 
tation of this campaign has been greater than the statement of our 
heavy loss of wagons and supplies. The orders submitted will show 
conclusively that every arrangement was made, in the utmost detail, 
for the security of our trains and supplies, and I am quite convinced 
that Gen. Banks is not the man to neglect the duty with which he 
was charged. 

I arrived at Centreville between 9 and 10 o'clock on the night of the 
30th. On the same night I sent orders to the Corps commanders to 
report to me in person as early after daylight as possible on the morn- 
ing of the 31st, and on that morning the troops were directed to be 



29 

posted as follows : Porter was to occupy the entrencliments on the 
north or right of Centreville ; Franklin on his left in the intrench- 
ments; in rear of Centreville, between Franklin and Porter, as a sup- 
port, was posted the Corps of Heintzelman ; Sigel occupied the iu- 
trenchments on the left and south side of the town, with Reno on his 
left and rear. Banks was ordered to take post as soon as he arrived, 
on the north side of Bull Run, and to cover the bridge on the road 
from Centreville to Manassas Junction ; Sumner, as soon as he arrived, 
was ordered to take post between Centreville and Chantilly, and to 
occupy Chantilly in force ; McDowell was posted about two miles in 
the rear of Centreville, on the road to Fairfax Court House. Ammu- 
nition trains and some provisions were gotten up on the 31st, and all 
Corps commanders were notified, by special orders to each, that the 
ammunition trains were parked immediately in the rear of Centre- 
ville, and were directed to send officers to procure such ammunition as 
was needed in their respective Corps. I directed the whole of the 
trains of the army to be unloaded at Centreville, and sent to Fairfax 
Station to bring up forage and rations. 

We remained during the whole day of the 31st resting the men, 
getting up supplies of provisions, and resupplying the commands with 
ammunition. 

The enemy's cavalry appeared in force in front of our advance at 
Cub Run, during the morning of the 31st, but made no attempt to 
cross, and no attack upon our troops posted there. A few pieces of 
artillery were fired, but with no result on either side. 

The whole force that I had at Centreville, as reported to me by the 
Corps commanders, on the morning of the 1st of September, after receiv- 
ing the Corps of Sumner and Franklin, was as follows : McDowell's 
Corps, 10,000 men; Sigel's Corps, about 7,000 ; Heintzelman's Corps, 
about 6,000 ; Reno's, 6,000; Banks', 5,000; Sumner's, 11,000; Porter's 
10,000; Franklin's 8,000— in all 63,000 men. From these forces 
two Brigades, as I before stated, had been sent to Fairfax Station, to 
guard the trains and the depot at that place, which makes it necessary 
to deduct 4,000 men. It is proper for me to state here, and I do it 
with regret and reluctance, that at least one-half of this great dimi- 
nution of our forces was occasioned by skulking and straggling from 
the army. The troops which were brought into action fought with 
gallantry and determination, but thousands of men straggled away 
from their commands, and were not in any action. I had posted sev- 
eral regiments in rear of the field of battle, on the 29th of August, 
and although many thousand stragglers and skulkers were arrested by 
them, many others passed around through the woods, and did not rejoin 
their commands during the remainder of the campaign. I had tele- 
graphed to the G-eneral-in-Chief, from Rappahannock Station, on the 
22d, that this practice of straggling was very common, and was redu- 
cing our force considerably even at that time. I also sent orders on 
the same day to Gen. Sturgis, to arrest all stragglers arriving in Alex- 
andria; to confine them in military prisons, and to bring them to 
speedy trial. The active and incessant movements of the array pre- 



30 

vented me, during the whole of this campaign, from giving that 
attention to the subject, except in orders, which ought to be and 
must be given to it, to preserve efficiency and discipline among any 
troops. Our cavalry at Centreville was completely broken down, no 
horses whatever having reached us to remount it. Gens. Buford and 
Bayard, commanding the whole of the cavalry force of the army, re- 
ported to me that there were not five horses to the company that could 
be forced into a trot. It was impossible, therefore, to cover our front 
with cavalry, or to make cavalry reconnoissances, as is usual and ne- 
cessary in front of an army. 

I directed Gen. Sumner, on the morning of the 1st of September, 
to push forward a reconnoissance of two Brigades toward the Little 
Biver Turnpike, to ascertain if the enemy were making any move- 
ments in the direction of Germantown or Fairfax Court ilouse. The 
enemy was found moving again slowly toward our right ; heavy col- 
umns of his forces being in march toward Fairfax along Little River 
Pike. The main body of our forces was so much broken down and 
so completely exhausted, that they were in no condition, even on the 
1st of September, for any active operations against the enemy ; but I 
determined to attack at daylight on the 2d of September, in front of 
Chantilly. The movement of the enemy had become so developed by 
the afternoon of the 1st, and was so evidently directed at Fairfax 
Court House, with a view of turning my right, that I made the ne- 
cessary disposition of troops to fight a battle between the Little River 
Pike and the road from Centreville to Fairfax Court House. I sent 
Gen. Hooker early in the afternoon to Fairfax Court House, and di- 
rected him to assemble all the troops that were in the vicinity, and to 
push forward to Germantown with his advance. I directed McDow- 
ell to move back along the road to Fairfax Court House, as far as 
Difficult Creek, and to connect by his right with Hooker. Reno was 
to push forward to the north of the road from Centreville to Fairfax, 
in the direction of Chantilly. Heintzelman's Corps was directed to 
take post on the road between Centreville and Fairfax, immediately in 
the rear of Reno. Franklin took post on McDowell's left and rear ; 
Sumner was posted on the left of Heintzelman, while the Corps of 
Sigel and Porter were directed to unite with the right of Sumner ; 
Banks was instructed with the wagon trains of the army to pursue 
the old Braddock road and come into the Alexandria turnpike in the 
rear of Fairfax Court House. Just before sunset on the 1st the ene- 
my attacked us on our right, but was met by Hooker, McDowell, 
Reno, and Kearney's Division of Heintzelman's Corps. A very se- 
vere action occurred in the midst of a terrific thunder storm, and was 
terminated shortly after dark. The enemy was driven back entirely 
from our front, but during that engagement we lost two of our best, 
and one of our most distinguished officers — Maj,-Gen. Kearney and 
Brig.-Gen. Stevens — who were both killed while gallantly leading 
their commands, and in front of their line of battle. It is unneces- 
sary for me to say one word in commendation of two officers who 
were so well and widely known to the country. Words cannot express 



31 

my sense of the zeal, the gallantry and the sympathy of that most 
earnest and accomplished soldier, Maj.-Gen. Kearney. In him the 
country has suffered a loss which it will be difficult, if not impossible, 
to repair. He died as he would have wished to die, and as became 
his heroic character. 

On the morning of the 2d of September, the enemy still continu- 
ing his movements toward our right, my whole force was posted be- 
hind Difficult Creek, from Flint Hill to the Alexandria turnpike. Al- 
though we were quite able to maintain our position at that place un- 
til the stragglers could be collected, and the army, after its labors and 
perils, put into condition for effective service, I considered it advisable, 
for reasons which developed themselves at Centreville, were commu- 
nicated to the General-in-Chief, and are set forth herewith in the ap- 
pendix, that the troops should be drawn back to the intrenchments in 
front of Washington, and that some reorganization should be made of 
them, in order that earlier effective service should be secured than 
was possible in their condition at that time. I received orders about 
12 o'clock on the 2d of September to drawback the forces within the 
intrenchments, which was done in good order, and without any inter- 
ruption by the enemy. 

The reasons which induced me, before I took the field in Virginia, 
to express to the Government my desire to be relieved from the com- 
mand of the Army of Virginia, and to return to the West, existed in 
equal, if not greater force, at this time than when I first stated them. 
I accordingly renewed urgently my application to be relieved. The 
Government assented to it with some reluctance, and I was transferred 
to the Department of the Northwest, for which Department I left 
Washington on the the 7th of September. 

It seems proper for me, since so much misrepresentation has been 
put into circulation as to the support I received from the Army of the 
Potamac, to state precisely what forces of that army came under my 
command, and were at any time engaged in the active operations of the 
campaign. Reynolds' Division of Pennsylvania reserves, about 2,500 
joined me on the 23d of August, at Rappahannock Station. The Corps 
of Heintzelman and Porter, about 18,000 strong, joined me on the 26th 
and 27th of August, at Warrenton Junction. The Pennsylvania re- 
serves, under Reynolds, and Heintzelman's Corps, consisting of the Di- 
visions of Hooker and Kearney, rendered most gallant and efficient ser- 
vice in all the operations which occurred after they had reported 
to me. Porter's Corps, from unnecessary and unusual delays, and 
frequent and flagrant disregard of my orders, took no part whatever 
except in the action of the 30th of August. This small fraction 
of 20,500 men was all of the 91,000 veteran troops from Harrison's 
Landing, which ever drew trigger under my command, or in any way 
took part in that campaign. By the time the Corps of Franklin and 
Sumner, 19,000 strong, joined me at Centreville, the original army of 
Virginia, as well as the Corps of Heintzelman, and the Division of 
Reynolds, had been so much cut up in the severe actions in which 
they had been engaged, and were so much broken down and dimin- 



32 

ished ia numbers by the constant and excessive duties they had per- 
formed, that they were in little condition for any effective service 
whatever, and required and should have had some days of rest to put 
them in anything like condition to perform their duties in the field. 

Such is the history of a campaign, substantiated by documents 
written during the operations, and hereto appended, which has been 
misunderstood to an extent perhaps, unparalleled in the history of war- 
fare. I submit it here to the public judgment, with all confidence 
that it will be fairly and deliberately considered, and a just verdict 
pronounced upon it, and upon the army engaged in it. Upon such 
unbiased judgment I am very willing (setting aside any previous re- 
cord I have made during the war) to rest my reputation as a soldier. 
I shall submit cheerfully to the verdict of my countrymen ; but I 
desire that that verdict shall be rendered upon a full knowledge of 
the facts. 

I well understood, as does every military man, how diflUcult and 
how thankless was the duty devolved upon me ; and I am not asham- 
ed to say that I would gladly have avoided it if I could have done so 
consistently with my sense of duty to the Government. To confront 
with a small army vastly superior forces ; to fight battles without hope 
of victory, but only to gain time, and to embarrass and delay the for- 
ward movement of the enemy, is of all duties the most hazardous and 
the most difficult that can be imposed upon any General or any 
army. "While such operations require the highest courage and en- 
durance on the part of the troops, they are, perhaps, unlikely to be 
understood or appreciated, and the results, however successful, have 
little in them to attract popular attention and applause. 

At no time could I have hoped to fight a successful battle with the 
immensely superior force of the enemy which confronted me, and 
which was able at any time to outflank me and bear my small army 
to the dust. It was only by constant movement, by incessant watch- 
fulness and hazardous skirmishes and battles that the forces under my 
command were not overwhelmed, while at the same time the enemy 
was embarrassed and delayed in his advance upon Washington until 
the forces from the Peninsula were at length assembled for the de- 
fence of the city. I did hope that, in the course of these operations 
the enemy might commit some imprudence or leave some opening, of 
which I could take such advantage as to gain at least a partial victory 
over his forces. This opportunity was presented by the advance of 
Jackson upon Manassas Junction ; but, although the best dispositions 
possible under the circumstances, were ordered, the object was frus- 
trated in a manner and by causes which are now well understood. I 
am gratified to know that the conduct of the campaign, every detail of 
which was communicated, day by day, to the General-in-Chief, was 
fully approved by him and by the Government, and I now gladly 
submit the subject to the judgment of the country. 

Gen. Banks rendered most efficient and faithful service throughout 
the campaign, and his conduct at the battle of Cedar Mountain, and 
the operations on the Upper Rappahannock, was marked by great 



33 

coolness, intrepidity and zeal. Gen. McDowell led his Corps during 
the whole campaign with ability and vigor, and I am greatly indebted 
to him for zealous and distinguished service, both in the battles of 
the 29th and 30th of August, and in the operations which pre- 
ceded and succeeded those battles. Gen. Sigel rendered useful ser- 
vice in reorganizing and putting in condition the First Army Corps 
of the Army of Virginia, and made many valuable and highly impor- 
tant reconnoissances during the operations of the campaign. I can- 
not express myself too highly of the zealous, gallant and cheerful 
manner in which Gen. Reno deported himself from the beginning to 
the end of the operations. Ever prompt, earnest and soldierly, he 
was the model of an accomplished soldier and gallant gentleman, and 
his loss has been a heavy blow to the army and to the country. 

Gen. Heintzelman performed his duty faithfully and honestly, while 
the commanders of the Divisions of his Corps (Gens. Kearney and 
Hooker,) have that place in the public estimation which they have 
earned by many gallant and heroic actions and which renders it un- 
necessary for me to do aught except pay this tribute to the memory 
of one and to the rising fame of the other. Gens. Williams, Auger, 
Crawford, Green, Geary, Carroll and Prince, of Banks' Corps, have 
been already noticed for their gallant and distinguished conduct at 
Cedar Mountain. Gens. King and Ricketts, of McDowell's Corps led 
their Divisions throughout the operations, with skill and efficiency, 
and Gen. King, before he marched from Fredericksburg, rendered im- 
portant service in organizing and dispatching the expeditions which, 
on several occasions, broke up the line of the Virginia Central Rail- 
road. Gens. Patrick, Doubleday, Gibbon, Hartsuff, Duryea and Tow- 
er commanded their Brigades in the various operations of the cam- 
paign, with ability and zeal. The last named officer especially was 
particularly distinguished by the long marches which he made, by his 
untiring activity, and by the distinguished gallantry he displayed in 
the action of the 30th of August, in which action he was severely 
wounded at the head of his Brigade. Gen. Hatch, after being relieved 
from the command of the cavalry of Banks' Corps, was assigned to 
the command of an infantry brigade in King's Division of McDowell's 
Corps, and during part of the operations was in command of that Di- 
vision, and rendered good service. Gens. Schenck and Milroy, of 
Sigel's Corps, exhibited great gallantry and zeal throughout the ope- 
rations. They were engaged actively in the battles of the 29th and 
30th of August, and their commands were among the last to leave the 
field of battle on the night of the 30th, Gen. Schenck being severely 
wounded on that day. 

I must also mention in high terms the conduct of Gens. Schurz, 
Stahl and Steinwehr, during the actions of the 29th and 30th. 
Gens. Birney, Robinson and Grover, of Heintzelman's Corps, com- 
manded their Brigades during the actions of the 29th and 30th, and 
Birney during the action of the 1st of September, with zeal and gal- 
lantry, and Gens. Birney and Grover were especially distinguished in 
5 



34 

the actions of the 29th and 30th. of August, and Birney also in the 
engagement of the 1st of September. 

Gen. Stevens, of Reno's Corps, was zealous and active throughout 
the operations, and distinguished himself in the most conspicuous 
manner during the battles of the 29th and 30th of August. He 
was killed at the head of his command in the battle near Chantilly 
on the 1st September, and his death will be deeply felt by the army and 
the country. Lieut.-Col. R. C Buchannan, commanding a brigade of 
regulars of Porter's Corps, was noticeable for distinguished service in 
the afternoon of the 30th of August. Of the conduct of the other 
officers commanding divisions or brigades of Porter's Corps, I know 
nothing, having received no report from that officer of the operations 
of his Corps. Brig, Gen. John F. Reynolds, commanding the Penn- 
sylvania Reserves, merits the highest commendation at my hands. 
Prompt, active, and energetic, he commanded his division with distin- 
guished ability throughout the operations, and performed his duties 
in all situations with zeal and fidelity. Gens. Seymour and Meade, 
of that division, in like manner performed their duties with ability 
and gallantary, and in all fidelity to the Government and to the army. 
Gen. Sturgis arrived at Warrenton Junction on the 26th of August, 
with Piatt's Brigade of his Division, the only portion of that Divis- 
ion which ever joined me. This Brigade was temporarily attached to 
the army Corps of Pitz John Porter, and although misled in conse- 
quence of orders to follow Griffin's Brigade of that Corps, which, for 
some unexplained reason, strayed from its Corps to Centreville on the 
30th of August, was led forward from that place by Gens. Sturgis and 
Piatt as soon as it was discovered that Griffin did not intend to go for- 
ward to the field of battle, and reported to me late in the afternoon of 
that day. Shortly afterward the ]3rigade was thrown forward into ac- 
tion ou our left, where they acquitted themselves with great courage. 
Brig. -Gen. Sturgis, as well as Gen. Piatt, deserve especial mention for 
the soldierly feeling which induced them, after being thus misled, and 
with the bad example of Griffin before their eyes, to push forward 
with such zeal and alacrity to the field of battle, and for the valuable 
services which they rendered in the action of the 30th of August. 
Gens. Bayard and Buford commanded all of the cavalry belonging to 
the Army of Virginia. Their duties were peculiarly arduous and 
hazardous, and it is not too much to say, that throughout the opera- 
tions, from the first to the last day of the campaign, scarce a day 
passed that these officers did not render services which entitle them 
to the gratitude of the Government. The detachment of the signal 
Corps with the various army Corps rendered most important service, 
and I cannot speak too highly of the value of that Corps, and of the 
important information which, from time to time, they communicated 
to me. They were many times in positions of extreme peril, but were 
always prompt, and ready to encounter any danger in the discharge of 
their duties. Brig. Gen. Julius White, with one Brigade, was in the 
beginning of the campaign placed in command at Winchester. He 
was selected for that position because I felt entire confidence in his 



35 

courage and ability, and during the whole of his service there, he per- 
formed his duty with the utmost efficiency, and relieved me entirely 
from any apprehension concerning that region of country. He 
was withdrawn from his position by orders direct from Washington, 
and passed from under my command. I transmit herewith reports of 
Corps, Division, and Brigade commanders, which will be found to em- 
brace all the details of their respective operations, and which do jus- 
tice to the officers and soldiers under their command. To my personal 
staff I owe much gratitude and many thanks. Their duties were par- 
ticularly arduous, and at times led them into the midst of the various 
actions in which we were engaged. It is saying little when I state 
that they were zealous, untiring, and efficient throughout the campaign. 

To Brig.-Gen. Roberts, in particular, I am indebted for services 
marked throughout by skill, courage, and unerring judgment, and 
worthy of the solid reputation as a soldier he has acquired by many 
years of previous faithful and distinguished military service. I desire, 
also, especially to mention Brig.-Gen. Elliott, Surgeon McParlin, Col. 
Beckwith, Lieut. Col. T. C H. Smith, Capt. Piper, Chief of Artill- 
ery, Capt. Merrill of the Engineers, and Lieut. Schunk, Chief of 
Ordinance. I must also honorably mention the following members 
of my staff, the conduct of all of whom met my hearty approval, and 
merits high commendation : Cols. Macomb, Clary, Marshall, Butler, 
Morgan, and "Welch ; Majors Selfridge, and Meline ; Capts. Asch, 
Douglas Pope, Haight, Atcheson, De Kay, Piatt, Paine, and Strother. 
Mr, McCain, confidential telegraph operator at my head quarters, ac- 
companied me throughout the campaign, and was at all times eminent- 
ly useful and efficient. My personal escort, consisting of two small com- 
panies of the First Ohio Cavalry, numbering about one hundred men, 
performed more arduous service, probably, than any troops in the 
campaign. As orderlies, messengers, and guards they passed many 
sleepless nights and weary days. Their conduct in all the operations, 
as in every battle, was marked by uncommon activity and gallantry. 
The reports of Corps, Divisions, and Brigade commanders, herewith 
submitted, exhibit the loss in killed, wounded, and missing in their 
respective commands. No report of any description has been receiv- 
ed from the army Corps of Banks and Reno. 

I am. General, respectfully, your obedient servant, 

JNO. POPE, Major General. 

Brig.-Gen. G. W. Cullum, Chief of Staff and Engineers, Head- 
quarters of the Army. 



APPENDIX. 



[Copies of such of the Dispatches and Orders sent and received dur- 
ing the Campaign of the Army of Virginia as are referred to in the 
body of the Report, and are necessary to explain in detail the oper- 
ations of that campaign.] 

Headquarters Army of Virginia, | 
Washington, July 18, 1862. j 
General Orders No. 5. — Hereafter, as far as practicable, the troops 
of this command will subsist upon the country in which their opera- 
tions are carried on. In all cases supplies for this purpose will be ta- 
ken by the officers to whose department they properly belong, under 
the orders of the commanding officer of the troops for whose use they 
are intended. Vouchers will be given to the owners, stating on their 
face that they will be payable at the conclusion of the war, upon suffi- 
cient testimony being furnished that such owners have been loyal citi- 
zens of the United States since the date of the vouchers. Whenever 
it is known that supplies can be furnished in any district of the coun- 
try where the troops are to operate, the use of trains for carrying sub- 
sistence will be dispensed with as far as possible. 
By Command of Maj.-Gren. Pope. 

Geo. D. Ruggles, Col., A. A. G. and Chief of Staff. 
Official : T. C. H. Smith, Lt.-Col. and A. D. C. 



Headquarters Army of Virginia, 1 
Washington, July 18, 1862. j 

General Orders No. 6. — Hereafter, in any operations of the cav- 
alry forces in this command, no supply nor baggage trains of any des- 
cription will be used, unless so stated specially in the order for the 
movement. Two days cooked rations will be carried on the persons 
of the men, and all villages or neighborhoods through which they 
pass will be laid under contribution in the manner specified by General 
Orders No. 5, current series, from these headquarters, for the subsist- 
ence of men and horses. Movements of cavalry must always be made 
with celerity, and no delay in such movements will be excused here- 
after on any pretext. 

Whenever the order for the movement of any portion of this army 
emanates from these headquarters, the time of marching and that to 



37 

be consumed in the execution of the duty will be specifically designa- 
ted, and no departure therefrom will be permitted to pass unnoticed 
without the gravest and most conclusive reasons. 

Commanding officers will be held responsible for strict and prompt 
compliance with every provision of this order. 
By command of Maj.-Gen. Pope. 

Geo. D. Ruggles, Col., A. A. G., and Chief of Staff. 
Official : T. C. H. Smith, Lt.-Col. and A. D. C. 



Headquarters Army of Virginia, ) 
Washington, July 20, 1862. j 

General Orders No. 7. — The people of the Valley of the Shenan- 
doah, and throughout the region of operations of this Army, living 
along the lines of railroad and telegraph, and along the routes of travel 
in rear of the United States forces, are notified that they will be held 
responsible for any injury done to the track, line or road, or for any 
attacks upon trains or straggling soldiers by bands of guerrillas in 
their neighborhood. No privileges and immunities of warfare apply 
to lawless bands of individuals not forming part of the organized for- 
ces of the enemy nor wearing the garb of soldiers, who, seeking and 
obtaining safety on pretext of being peaceful citizens, steal out in rear 
of the Army, attack and murder straggling soldiers, molest trains of 
supplies, destroy railroads, telegraph lines and bridges, and commit 
outrages disgraceful to civilized people and revolting to humanity. 
Evil disposed persons in rear of our armies, who do not themselves 
engage directly in these lawless acts, encourage them by refusing to 
interfere or to give any information by which such acts can be prevent- 
ed, or the perpetrators punished. 

Safety of life and property of all persons living in the rear of our 
advancing armies depends upon the maintenance of peace and quiet 
among themselves, and of the unmolested movement through their 
midst of all pertaining to the militaiy service. They are to under- 
stand distinctly that this security of travel is their only warrant of 
personal safety. 

It is therefore ordered, that wherever a railroad, wagon road, or tele- 
graph, is injured by parties of guerrillas, the citizens living within 
five miles of the spot shall be turned out in mass to repair the dam- 
age, and shall, besides, pay to the United States, in money or in pro- 
perty, to be levied by military force, the full amount of the pay and 
subsistence of the whole force necessary to coerce the performance of 
the work during the time occupied in completing it. 

If a soldier or legitimate follower of the Army be fired upon from 
any house, the house shall be razed to the ground, and the inhabitants 
sent prisoners to the headquarters of this Army. If such an outrage 
occur at any place distant from settlements, the people within five 
miles around shall be held accountable and made to pay an indemnity 
sufficient for the case. 

Any persons detected in such outrages, either during the act or at 
any time afterward, shall be shot without awaiting civil process. 



S8 

No such acts can influence the result of this war, and they can on- 
ly lead to heavy afflictions to the population to no purpose. 

It is therefore enjoined upon all persons, both for the security of 
their property and the safety of their own persons, that they act vigor- 
ously and cordially together to prevent the perpetration of such 
outrages. 

While it is the wish of the General commanding this Army that 
all peaceably disposed persons who remain at their homes and pur- 
sue their accustomed avocations shall be subjected to no improper 
burden of war, yet their own safety must, of necessity, depend up- 
on the strict preservation of peace and order among themselves, and 
they are to understand that nothing will deter him from enforcing 
promptly and to the full extent, every provision of this order. 
By command of Maj.-Glen. Pope. 

aeo. D. Ruggles, Col., A. A. G., and Chief of Staff. 
Official : Lt. Col. Smith, Aid-de-Camp. 



Headquarters Army of Virginia, ") 
Washington, July 23, 1863. | 

General Orders, No. 11. — Commanders of Army Corps, Divis- 
ions, Brigades, and detached commands, will proceed immediately 
to arrest all disloyal male citizens within their lines, or within 
their reach, in rear of their respective stations. 

Such as are willing to take the oath of allegiance to the United 
States, and will furnish sufficient security for its observance, shall be 
permitted to remain at their homes, and pursue, in good faith their 
accustomed avocations. 

Those who refuse shall be conducted South, beyond the extreme 
pickets of this army, and be notified that if found again any- 
where within our lines, or at any point in rear, they will be considered 
spies, and subjected to the extreme rigor of military law. 

If any person, having taken the oath of allegiance, as above speci- 
fied, be found to have violated it, he shall be shot, and his property 
seized and applied to the public use. 

All communication with any persons whatever, living within the 
lines of the enemy, is positively prohibited, except through the mil- 
itary authorities, and in the manner specified by military law; and 
any person concerned in writing or in carrying letters or messages in 
any other way, will be considered and treated as a spy within the 
lines of the United States Army. 

By command of Major-Gen. Pope. 

Geo. D. Buggies, Col. A. A. G., and Chief of Staff. 
Official : T. C. H. Smith, Lieut.-Col., and A. D. C. 



Headquarters Army of Virginia, ) 

Near Sperryville, Va., Aug. 6, 1862. J 
General Orders, No. 13. — Hereafter, in all marches of the Ar- 
my, no straggling, or lagging behind, will be allowed. Commanders 
of regiments will be held responsible that this order is observed, and 



39 

they will march habitually in the rear of their regiments — company 
commanders in the rear of their respective companies- 

They will suffer no men of their command to fall behind them on 
any excuse, except by a written permit of the Medical Officer of the 
regiment, that they are too sick to perform the march, and therefore 
must ride in ambulances. 

Medical officers will be responsible that no such written pass is im- 
properly given. 

Regimental trains will march in rear of the divisions to which the 
regiments belong in the order of precedence of the regiments in 
that division. Brigade and division supply trains will follow in the 
rear of the respective army corps to which they belong. 

Ambulance and ammunition wagons will follow in rear of their re- 
spective regiments, and under no consideration whatever, will any 
wagon or other vehicle be placed in the column of march, other than 
as hereinbefore specified. 

Officers and soldiers of this army will habitually carry two days' 
cooked rations upon their persons when ordered to perform a march. 

It is recommended to commanders of Corps d'armee that in all cases 
when it is practicable, the shelter tents and knapsacks of the men be 
carried in the wagons. 

At least one hundred rounds of ammunition per man will be car- 
ried habitually in the cartridge-boxes and on the persons of the men, 
and any Captain of a company, whose men at any time are defficient 
in this amount of ammunition, will be arrested and reported to the 
War Department for dismissal from the service. A proper staff officer 
will be sent from these Headquarters to inspect the troops while on 
the march, who will report to the Major-General commanding, any vio- 
lation of, or d&parture from the provisions of this order. Neither 
officer nor soldier will be permitted to leave his command while on 
the march, or enter any house, without a written permit from his 
Brigade commander. Where soldiers are obliged for necessary pur- 
poses to leave the ranks while on the march, they will turn over their 
muskets and accoutrements to the next men on their right, who will 
carry the arms accoutrements, and be responsible for them till the 
owners shall have again taken their places in the ranks. 

Commanders of Corps will prescribe the number of rounds of artil- 
lery ammunition to be carried with each battery ; but in no case shall 
any battery be left with less than 200 rounds for each gun. As good 
order and decipline are essential to the success of any army, a strict 
compliance with the provisions of this order is enjoined upon all offi- 
cers and soldiers of this command, and they are expected and requir- 
ed to report to their superior officers every departure from them. 
While the Major-Greneral commanding the army will see to it that 
every soldier is kindly cared for, and supplied with everything neces- 
sary for his comfort, he takes occasion to announce to the army, that 
the severest punishment will be inflicted upon every officer and soldier 
who neglects his duty, and connives at, or conceals any such neglect 
of duty or disobedience of orders on the part of any other officer or 
soldier. 



40 

Commanders of Army Corps will see that this order is published im- 
mediately after the receipt at the head of every regiment in their com- 
mand. 

By command of Maj.-Gen. Pope. 

R. 0. Selfridge, Asst. Adjt.-Gen. 
Official : T. C H. Smith, Lieut.-Col., and A. D. C 



Infty. 

First Army Corps, 10,550 

Second Army Corps, 13,343 

Third Army Corps, 17,604 



Arty. 


Cav. 


Total. 


948 


1,730 


13,228 


1,224 


4,104 


18,671 


971 


2,904 


21,479 



Total, 41,497 3,143 8,738 53,378 

Deduct lut'ty Brig, stationed at Winchester, 2,500 

Deduct Regiment and Battery at Front Royal, 1,000 

Deduct Cavalry unfit for service, 3,000 6,500 

Total, 46,878 

(See correspondence on the subject with Gen. Banks.) 

Note — Instead of 14,500 infantry and artillery Banks had only 
about 8,000, from his report to me after the battle of Cedar Moun- 
tains. 

I certify that this is a true copy of the consolidated morning report 
of the Army of Virginia, dated July 31st, 1862, commanded by Maj. 
Gen. Pope. 

Myer Asch, Capt. and A. D. C. 



United States Military Telegraph, 
War Department, Washington, D. C., June 30th, 1862. 
Middletown, June 30th, — 1.10 p. m. 
Time received : 1-45 p. m. 

(Extract.) 
3Iaj.-Ge7i. John Pope : * * * The troops forming 

1st Corps are not in good condition. They are weakened and poorly 
provided. The organization is not complete, and the whole cavalry 
force consists of not more than eight hundred (800) effective men and 
horses. They are scarcely sufficient for picket and patrol duty, so 
that I can hardly make a reconnoissance. * * * * 
(Signed) F. Sigel, Maj.-Gen. Commanding. 

A true copy: T. C. H. Smith, Lt.-Col., and A. D. C. 



Dispatches and orders sent and received from Aug. 8, to Aug. 20, 
inclusive. 

Headquarters Army of Virginia, ) 

Culpepper C H., Aug. 8, 1862. | 

Major Gen. Saileck, Washington, — One Division of the enemy, 

Elzey's, crossed the Rapidan to-day, at Barnett's Ford, about five 

miles west of the railroad crossing:, and rested at Robertson's River. 



41 

This is probably a reconnoissance in force, but it may be possibly an 
advance upon Culpepper- One Division of McDowell's and the whole 
of Banks' Corps are here to-night. Sigel's will be here to-morrow 
morning, when I will push the enemy again behind the llapidao, and 
take up a strong position as you suggest in your dispatch of this 
date. I will be very careful that my communications with Freder- 
icksburg are not interrupted. We captured to-day about forty pris- 
oners from the enemy, our loss being one cavalry soldier killed, and 
one wounded. 

I have directed King to march to-morrow and cross the Rapidan 
on the plank road at Germania Mills, or Ely's Ford, just below it. It 
is about 35 miles from Fredericksburg to this point. 

(Signed) Jno. Pope, Maj.-Gen., Commanding. 

A true copy : T. C. H. Smith, Liut.-Col. and A. D. C. 



Headquarters, Army op Virginia, 
Culpepper, C. H., Aug. 8, 1862. 
General: — The General commanding directs me, in reply to your 
dispatch of this date, 6:50 p. M., inquiring what road you shall take, 
to say that you are to march direct to Culpepper C. H., by the 
turnpike. He is surprised that you make this inquiry after his defi- 
nite instructions of this morning. He directs that you reach this 
point by 12 M. to-morrow. 

With great respect, General, your obd't serv't, 
[Signed] T. C H. Smith, Lieut.-Col. and A. D. C. 

Maj.-Gen. Sigel, Com. 1st Army Corps. 
A true copy : T. C. H. Smith, Lieut.-Col. and A. D. C 



Received at Headquarters 2d Army Corps, 8:10 A. M. 9th August. 

Madison Court-House, Aug. 8. 
To Maj.-Gen. Banhs: — All of my force is withdrawn irom Madi- 
son Court-House, and is in retreat toward Sperryville. The enemy 
is in force on both my right and left, and in my rear. I may be cut 
off. 

[Signed] John Buford, Brigadier-General. 

Received by signal, 8 a. m., Fairfax, Va. 
A true copy : T. C H. Smith, Lieut-Col. and A. D. C. 



Headquarters, 3d Army Corps, Army of Virginia, "I 
Culpepper Court-House, August 9, 1862. J 

Maj.-Gen. Pope, &c. — Geveral : I have just received a letter from 
the Colonel of the Rhode Island cavalry, vfho says : "All is quiet in 
front of us. The enemy is always before my videttes ; on my left 
there is, perhaps, a regiment of rebel infantry. In a word, I do not 
believe the enemy to be in forc3 in our front. Gen. Bayard has just 
ordered me to march to repulse the enemy." 

Very, respectfully, General, your obedient servant, 
[Signed] Irwin McDowell, 

Major-General, Commanding, 31 A. C. A. V. 
A true copy: T. C. H. Smith, Lieut.-Col. and A. D. C. 



42 

Headquarters Army of Virginia, Second Corps 

J5 miu., 9th Aug., 



} 



Mojor-Gen. Pope: — Gen. William's Division has taken position on 
the Pike, the right on a heavy body of woods. Gen. Augur on the left, 
his left resting on a mountain, occupied by his skirmishers. He will 
soon be in position. The enemy shows his cavalry (which is strong) 
ostentatiously. No infantry seen, and not much artillery. Woods on 
left said to be full of troops. A visit to the front does not impress 
that the enemy intends immediate attack. He seems, however, to be 
taking positions. 

[Signed] N. P. Banks. 

A true copy: T. C. H. Smith, Lieut.-Col. and A. D. C 



Headquarters Army Second Corps, ) 
4 hours 50 min., Aug. 9, 1862. \ 

Col. Riiggles, Chief of Staff: — About 4 o'clock shots were ex- 
changed by the skirmishers. Artillery opened fire on both sides in 
a few minutes. One regiment of rebel infantry advancing, now de- 
ploying in front as skirmishers. I have ordered a regiment on the 
right, William's Division, to meet them, and one from the left, 
Auger's, to advance on the left and in front. 
5 p.m. [Signed] N.P.Banks. 

They are now approaching each other. 
A true copy: T. C H. Smith, Lieut.-Col. and A. D. C. 



United States Military Telegraph, | 
From War Department, Washington, Aug. 18, 1S62. J 
To Gen. Pojste : — 1 fully approve your movement. I hope to push 
a part of Buruside's forces to near Barnett's Ford by to-morrow 
night, to assist you in holding that pass. Stand firm on the line of 
the Rappahannock till I can help you. Fight hard and aid will soon 
come. H. W. Halleck, Gen. -in-Chief. 

A true copy; T. C. H. Smith, Lieut.-Col. and A. D. C. 



Headquarters Army of Virginia, ] 
Rappahannock Station, August 20, 1862. J 
Major- Gen, Halleck : Your dispatch of yesterday, received last 
night. I shall mass my whole force along what is known as Marsh 
Run, about two and a half or three miles north-east of Rappahannock 
Ford, occupying Kelly's Ford with an advanced guard from my left, 
Rappahannock Ford with an advanced guard from the center, and 
picketing strongly with cavalry the fords above me as far as the 
road from Sperryville to Warrenton. If the enemy attempt to turn 
my right by the way of Sulphur Springs, they will probably march 
direct on Warrenton, from which place a good turnpike conducts to 
Washington. Such a movement, however, will expose their flank and 
rear, and you may be sure I will not lose the opportunity. My right 
will be considerably refused along the railroad as far at least as Beal- 
ton Station. What relations with me will the Corps of Fitz John 



43 

Porter have ? I should like to know exactly. I am going out to 
post my command. I have heard from Keno. He crossed safely 
yesterday at Kelly's Ford and Barnett's Ford. The enemy so far has 
made no movement in advance. I think they are not yet ready, for 
want of transportation for supplies, to cross the Rapidan. 

John Pope, Maj.-Gen. 
A true copy : T. C. H. Smith, Lt.-Col. and A. D. C. 

Dispatches and Orders sent and received from Aurj. 2\st to 24^/i, in- 
clusive. 

United States Military Telegraph, \ 

Received Aug. 21st, 1862, from War Department, Washington. \ 
To General Fope : — I have telegraphed Qea. Burnside to know at 
what hour he can re-enforce Reno. Am waiting his answer. Every 
effort must be made to hold the Rappahannock. Large forces will be 
in to-morrow. 

(Signed) H. W. Halleck, General in Chief. 

A true copy : T. C. H. Smith, Liut.-Col. and A. D. C. 



Headquarters Army of Virginia, \ 
Rappahannock Station, Aug. 21st, 1862. J 
Maj.-Gen. Hallech : — The enemy has made no further advance 
since yesterday afternoon, but his cavalry pickets are in plain view of 
our front. After full examination of the ground I Iiave determined 
to maintain the line of the Rappahannock instead of Alarsh Creek. 
I have accordingly occupied advanced and comuianding positions on 
the south side of the river, and have three bridges besides the fords, 
to connect with them. The main body of my command is posted along 
the north side of the river, having easy access to the front. I have 
masked the fords above and below me with infantry, cavalry and artil- 
lery, and have no concern about any attack in the front, though as 
previously suggested, my right can be turned at considerable distance 
above me. This, however, will require time, and will be, besides, a 
hazardous operation. We drew back behind the Rappahannock in 
perfect order, without leaving any article whatever. 

(Signed) John Pope, Major-G-eneral. 

A true copy : T. C. H. Smith, Lieut.-Col. and A. D. C. 



United States Military Telegraph, 
War Department Washington, August 21st, 1862. 
To General Pope: — I have have just sent Gen. Burnside's reply. 
Gen. Cox's forces are coming in from Parkersburg, and will be here 
to-morrow and the next day. Dispute every inch of ground, and fight 
like the devil, till we can reinforce you. Forty-eight hours more, and 
we can make you strong enough. Don't yield an inch if you can 
help it. H. W. Halleck, General-in-Chief. 

A true copy: T. C H. Smith, Lieut.-Col. and A. D. C 



Headquarters, Army of Virginia, ) 
Rappahannock Station, Aug. 22d, 1862 — 12 o'clock m. j 
* Command hif] Officer ^ Warrenton Junction : — Keep your cavalry 
scouring the roads and pick up stragglers. You will keep them un- 
der guard at Catlett's Station, or use them for fatigue duty. 
By order of Maj.-Gen. Pope. 
(Signed) Geo. I), lluggles, Col. and Chief of Staff. 

A true copy : T. C. H. Smith, Lieut.-Col. and A. D. C. 



Headquarters, Army of Virginia, ] 
Rappahannock Station, Aug. 22d, 1862 — 12 o'clock, m. j 
Major- General Halleck: — The number of stragglers leaving this 
army just now, and the ease with which they escape, are becoming 
serious. Can they not be arrested and coufiued in prison at Wash- 
ington, as I have not at present the means to bring them here, or to 
keep them when I get them ? 

(Singed) John Pope, M. G-. 

A true copy : T. C H. Smith, Lieut.-Col. and A. D. C. 



Headquarters, Army op Virginia, ) 
Aug. 22d, 1882—10-30 a. m. \ 
Major General Halleck : — It is very apparent that the enemy is 
moving, with a view of turning our right. He has no forces further 
east than Stevensburg, and everything is tending up the river. 
I presume he Avill cross, if possible, at Sulphur Springs, on the pike 
to Washington. I would suggest that all the forces being sent from 
Fredericksburg be pushed forward immediately as far as this place, as 
I think there is no danger whatever on the lower fords of the Rappa- 
hannock. A captured letter from Gen. Robert Lee to Gen. Stuart, 
dated at Gordonsvillc, Aug. 15, clearly indicates their movement. We 
had several handsome skirmishes yesterday, in one of which one of 
our cavalry regiments, on the south side of the river, charged over 
a regiment of rebel infantry, dispersing them and driving them into 
the woods. Seventy head of the enemy's beef cattle and seven horses 
were captured. There has been heavy artillery firing all this morning, 
the enemy not yet having finished his preparation for attack. My 
whole force is massed and well in hand. We have had a great many 
casualties 'within the last two days of skirmishing and cannonading. 
I cannot tell how many. 

(Signed) John Pope, Maj.-Gen. 

A true copy : T. C. H. Smith, Lt.-Col. and A. D. C. 



Headquarters, Army of Virginia, ) 

Rappahannock Station, Aug. 22d, 5 o'clock p. in., 1862. J 
Major General HallecJc : — I think that the troops of Heintzelman 
and Cos had best be landed from the train at Bealton Station, Kear- 
ney on or near Licking River, say two miles south-west of Warren- 
town Junction. The enemy has made no attempt to-day to cross the 
river. His movement up toward our right seems to have been con- 



45 

tinued all day. I have little doubt if lie crosses at all, it will be at 
Sulphur SiDrings. Under present circumstances I shall not attempt 
to prevent his crossing at Sulphur Springs, but will mass my whole 
force on his flank in the neighborhood of Fayetteville. By underta- 
king to defend the crossing at Sulphur Springs I would much ex- 
tend my lines and remove myself too far from the reenforcements that 
are arriving by railroad. Before the enemy can be fairly across the 
river with any considerable force, I shall be strong enough to advance 
from Fayetteville upon his flank. 

(Signed) John Pope, Major-General. 

A true copy: T. C. H. Smith, Lieut.-Col. and A. D. C. 

Headquarters Army op Virginia, ) 
Rappahannock Station, Aug 22d — 6-30 oclock, p. m. ) 
Major- General Ilallech : — Every thing indicates clearly to me 
that the enemy's movement will be upon Warrenton by way of Sul- 
phur Springs. If I could know with anything like certainty by what 
time to expect troops that arc starting from Alexandria, I could act 
more understandingly. I have not heard of the arrival of any of the 
forces from Fredericksburg at the fords below, though I have with- 
drawn nearly the whole of Reno's forces from Kelly's ford. I cannot 
move against Sulphur Springs just now without exposing my rear to 
the heavy force in front of me, and having my communication with 
the forces coming up the llappahannock intercepted, and most likely 
the railroad destroyed. I think it altogether well to bring Franklin's 
force to Alexandria. Lee made his headquarters at Culpepper last 
night. He has the whole of his army in front of me. Its numbers 
you can estimate as well as myself. As soon as his plans are fully de- 
veloped I shall be ready to act. 

(Signed) John Pope, Major-General. 

Ofiicial : T. C. H. Smith, Lt.-Col. and A. D. C. 



Headquarters Army of Virginia, 
Rappahannock Station, Aug. 22d, 1862 — 9 p. r 
Major- General Halleck : — Scouts report a heavy force moving up 
across Hedgeman River, on the Sperryville and Little Washington 
Pike, toward Warrenton ; also crossing at Sulphur Springs. I think 
a Brigade should be sent to guard the railroad bridge at Cedar Run, 
and that Heintzelman's Corps should be hurried forward with all pos- 
sible dispatch. 

(Signed) John Pope, Major-General. y 

A true copy : T. C. H. Siuith, Lieut.-Col. and A. D. C. 



Headquarters, Army of Virginia, ") 
Aug. 22d— 9-15 p. m. _ j 
Gen. Halleck: — Reports from our forces near Sulphur Springs just 
in. Enemy was crossing river to day at Sulphur Springs, and on the 
road from Warrenton to Sperryville ; he is still in heavy force at Rap- 
pahannock ford, and above, and my rear is entirely exposed, if I move 



46 

toward Sulphur Springs or Warrenton. I must do one of two things : 
either fall back and meet Heintzelman behind Cedar Run, or cross the 
Rappahannock, with my whole force and assail the enemy's flank and 
rear. I must do one or the other at daylight. Which shall it be ? 
I incline to the latter, but don't wish to interfere with your plans. 

(Signed) John Pope, Major-General. 

A true copy: T. C. H. Smith, Lt.-Col., and A. D. C. 



United States Military Telegraph, 
Received Aug. 22d, 1862, from War Department, 
W^ashington, August 22d, 1862 — 11 p. m. 
To Major-General Fope : — I think the latter of your two propositions 
the best. I also think you had better stop Heintzelman's Corps, and 
the troops of Sturgis and Cox, as they arrive to-morrow at Warrenton 
Junction, instead of taking them to Bealton. 

(Signed) H. W. Halleck, General-in-Chief 

A true copy: T. C. H. Smith, Lieut.-Col. and A. D. C. 



United States Military Telegraph, ) 
Received Aug. 22, 1862. From Manasses 10-04 p. m. j 
To General Pope : — We will continue to forward troops to Man- 
assas unless you order otherwise ; but beyond this point trains will be 
held to wait your orders, or until further information is received. 

(Signed) Haupt. 

A true copy : T. C H. Smith, Lieut.-Col., and A. D. C 



Headquarters Army of Virginia, 
Rappahannock Station, Aug. 23, 1882 — 2-20 o'clock a. m. 
Major General Halleck : — As nearly as I can learn the facts, the 
enemy's cavalry made a raid frorti the direction of Warrenton upon 
our wagon trains at Catlett's, and seems to have done some considera- 
ble damage to them through the gross carelessness of the guard, which 
was amply sufficient to protect them. Please hurry forward Heintzel- 
man, as the enemy may reach Warrenton Junction before he does. 
Please push forward also, all the troops moving up from Fredericks- 
burg, with orders to cross the Rappahannock at the various fords, and 
march rapidly on Stevensburg. My movement will be made to-mor- 
row, as soon as I find the enemy has passed a sufficient number of his 
troops over the river. The troops coming up from Fredericksburg 
should be hastened forward with all dispatch to Stevensburg and 
Brandy Station. It will be well, also, to send with them immediately 
a train of bread, sugar, coffee and salt, as our railroad communications 
may be unsafe for a few days. 

(Signed) John Pope, Major-G-eneral. 

A true copy: T. C. H. Smith, Lieut.-Col. and A. D. C. 

Headquarteks 1st Corps Army op Va., ] 
Aug. 23d, 1862. j 

Major General Pope, Commanding Army of Va. : — There is no 



47 

doubt that the eneaiy has outflanked us, and that his army crosses 
near Sulphur Springs and Fox's or Lawson's Ford. I therefore must 
instantly beg you to send Gen. Eeno's Division to Fayetteville, which 
will be good and necessary for all emergencies — but it should be done 
to-night, and immediately. Gen. Banks, instead of marching to Law- 
son's Ford, as directed by me, has not done it, and the enemy is there- 
fore crossing at Fox's Ford, from which ford Gen. Bayard retired an 
hour ago. From Fayetteville Gen. Reno can advance to Lawson's 
Ford, or maintain his position until you have made your proper ar- 
rangements. It would be, according to my opinion, the best to with- 
draw the 1st Corps toward Bealton, or my original position near Bev- 
erly Ford, to enable us to concentrate all our forces in a central posi- 
tion. Gen Reno would cover this movement, and we would gain one 
day. I am, General, respectfully yours 

(Signed) F. Sigel, Major-Gen. Com'ding 1st Corps. 

A true copy: T. C. H. Smith ,'^Lieut.-Col. and A. D. C. 

Headquarters Army op Virginia, ) 
August 23, 1862. \ 

Major-Gen. Sigel: — Your dispatch just received. Gen. Buford is 
at Fayetteville, and will watch any movement of the enemy toward 
that place, or toward your right. Stand firm and let the enemy 
develop toward Warreuton. Re-inforcements are constantly arri- 
ving in our rear. I do not wish any further extension of our lines 
to the right, but I desire the enemy to cross as large a force as he 
pleases in the direction of Warrenton. When I wish to concentrate 
on the railroad I will cover your movement back. Be under no con- 
cern, but keep your whole command ready to march at a moment's no- 
tice. Send word to Bayard to keep his position as far up the river as 
possible, and check, if you find it necessary, any attempt of the 
enemy to cross at Lawson's Ford. 

By order of Gen. Pope. 

[Signed] T. C. H. Smith, Lt.-Col. and A. D. C. 

A true copy : T. C. H. Smith, Lt.-Col. and A. D. C. 



Headquarters Army op Virginia, \ 
Aug. 23, 1862—7:15 o'clock a. m. j 
Major-Gen. Siyel : — The river has risen here six feet, and is en- 
tirely impassable at any ford. I have no doubt it is the same all the 
way up the river, as the main portion of the storm was above. The 
enemy, therefore, on this side is cut ofi" from those on the other, and 
there is no fear of this^ position. You will accordingly march at 
once upon Sulphur Springs, and thence toward Waterloo Bridge, at- 
tacking and beating the enemy wherever you find them. Banks' 
Corps and the force under Gen. Reno will accompany and support 
you. McDowell, with his whole Corps, marches direct on Warren- 
ton, and you will be brought together in that neighborhood t:-night. 
Move promptly up the river. The other troops will be close behind 
you. You ought to be in the neighborhood of Waterloo Bridge be- 



48 

fore sunset. I will accompany McDowell's Corps, and communicate 
further with you in the course of the day. You will have an effective 
force of 25,0(J0 men. Leave nothing behind you. 

[Signed] Juo. Pope, Major-Gen. 

A true copy : T. C. H. Smith, Lt.-Col. and A. D. C 



Headquarters Army of Virginia, ^ 
Aug. 23, 1862—7:35 o'clock, a. m. j 
Mnj.-Gen. Banks: — You will accompany and support Gen. Sigel in 
his forward movements toward Sulphur Springs and Waterloo Bridge. 
Gen. Heno will follow you closely for the same purpose. McDowell's 
Corps marches immediately upon Warrenton. The river has risen six 
feet, and is no longer passable by the enemy. His forces on this side 
are cut off from those on the other, and we will march against those 
on this side, and the whole force will unite between Warrenton and 
Waterloo Bridge. Call in Crawford at once, and leave nothing be- 
hind you. Follow Sigel very closely, and keep constant communica- 
tion with him, as also with Gen. Reno in your rear. Be quick, for 
time is everything. 

[Signed] Jno. Pope, Maj.-Gen. 

A true copy: T. C. H. Smith, Lt.-Col. and A. D. C. 



Headquarters Army op Virginia, 
Eappahannock Station, Aug. 23, 1862 — 9 a. m. 
Maj.-Gen. Halleck: — The heavy storm of yesterday and last night 
has caused the river to rise six feet. There arc no longer any fords, 
and the bridges are carried a\v^ay. I succeeded in time in withdraw- 
ing my advanced forces from the south side of the river. The move- 
ment across the river on the enemy's flank and rear is therefore im- 
possible. The enemy's forces on this side, which have crossed at 
Sulphur Springs and Hedgeman's River, are cut off from those on the 
south side. I march at once with my whole force on Sulphur Springs, 
Waterloo Bridge and Warrenton, in the hope to destroy these forces 
before the river runs down. The rain still continues, and I think we 
are good for thirty-six hours. As soon as I have effected this pur- 
pose, which I expect to do by an early hour to-morrow, I shall move 
back, detaching a large force to re-open my communications at Catlett's 
and send forward supplies. If Heintzelman and Cox move quickly it 
will be easy to hold the Rappahannock, leaving the enemy much 
damaged by his attempt to turn our right. You may not hear from 
me before to-morrow night. 

[Signed] John Pope, Major-General. 

A true copy : T. C. H. Smith, Lieut.-Col. and A. D. C. 



Headquarters Army of Virginia, | 
August 23, 1862—11 o'clock a. m. \ 
Gen. Reynolds : — You will please on arriving at Rappahannock Sta- 
tion, follow the route taken by the Army Corps of Gen. McDowell, 
passing Brig.-Gen. Tower who is in command of the rear guard, and 



49 

whom you will find near the railroad station. Please keep well closed 
and close up to the rear of McDowell's Corps. Our march is to War- 
renton, about ten miles distant, which you must make to-night. 
By order of Major-Gen. Pope, Commanding Army of Virginia. 

[Signed] T. C II. Smith, Lieut.-Col. and A. D. C 

A true copy: T. C. H. Smith, Lieut. Col. and A. D. C. 



Headquarters Army of Virginia, 
Near Warrenton, August 23, 1862—10 o'clock p. m. 
Major-Gen. Ilalieck : — My advance entered the town about an hour 
ago, the enemy evacuating it on our approach. They fell back toward 
Hedgeman's River and Sulphur Springs. At the latter place my left 
was engaged about sunset, and now awaits daylight. I shall move 
rapidly at daylight upon Sulphur Springs and Waterloo Bridge. It 
the enemy is really in large force on this side of the Rappahannock, 
he will be trapped, as the river is very high behind him. I will com- 
municate tomorrow. 

[Signed] Jno. Pope, Major-Geueral. 

A true copy : T. C. H, Smith, Lieut.-Col. and A. D. C 



Headquarters Army of Virginia, | 
Aug. 24, 1862—5 o'clock a. m. J 
Major-Gen. ^igel, Commayidtng, &c.: — The advance Division of 
JIcDowell's Corps occupied Warrenton last night without opposition. 
The head of his column was pushed just outside of town, on the road 
to Sulphur Springs, ready to move forward to that point should it be 
necessary. I am pushing a reconnoissauce toward Waterloo Bridge 
to see what is there. Communicate fully to me through Capt. Merrill, 
who will hand you this note, the condition of things in front of you. 
Our work must be finished here to-day. We have no time to spare. 
Provisions will be in Y/arrenton this morning. 

[Signed] Jno. Pope, Major-General. 

A true copy : T. C. H. Smith, Lt.-Col. and A. D. C 

United States Military Telegraph, ) 
Received Aug. 2i, 1862, from Alexandria, Aug. 2L 1862. ] 
[Extract.] 
To Maj.- Gen. Pope:— * * * Thirty thousand (30,000) 
troops or more demand transportation. It is clear that the sudden 
demand exceeds the capacity of the road. We can manage twelve 
thousand (12,00^) troops per day, with supplies, if no accident oc- 
curs. The new troops might march; the veterans go in cars; horses 
driven. Baggage, tents, (tc., wait until they can be forwarded ; sup- 
plies take precedence. [Signed] liaupt. 



to 



United States MrLiTART Telegraph, ) 
Alexandria, Aug. 24, 1852. ( 



[Extract.] 

Ma'or- Gni Pope : — * * * * "^g expect to clean 
out all the troops now here, and all that are expected to-day. * 
* * * * 

[Signed] II. Ilaupt. 

Headquarters First Coups, near Waterloo Bridge, ) 
August 2o, 180:!— l:iU p. m. } 

Cvl. Gfo. Ik Rw/glea, Chief of Staff : — Col. Beardsley reports the 
enemy's cavalry at Sulphur Springs, and the village occupied by he 
enemy's infantry. Col. Beardsley had been sent by rue to Sulphur 
Springs, with some cavalry and mountain howitzers. The main force 
of tlie enoiiiy is advancing on this place (Waterloo Bridge ) Gen. 
Ecno should send me the lO pound Parrotts. I could use them here 
excclUTitly, I am, Colonel, very lespectfully, 

[Siiiued] F. Sigel, 31iijor-Gen. Commanding 1st Corps. 

A tiue copy: T. C H. Smith, Lt. Col. and A. D. C. 



Headquarters Army of Virginia, ) 
WarrentoD, Aug. 2i, 1862— 3:45 p. m. ( 

Major- Gen. Halleck, General-in- Chiefs Washington: I arrived in 
Warrenton last night; the enemy had left two hours previously. 
Milroy's Brigade, the advance of Sigel's Corps, came upon the enemy 
late yesterdiiy afternoon, near Great Kun, about four miles from War- 
renton Sulphur Springs, and near the mouth of it. A sharp action 
took pLce which lasted till after dark, the enemy being driven across 
Great Jxiver, but destroying the bridge behind him. Early this 
morning Gen. Buford reached Waterloo Bridge, which was defended 
by a considerable force of the enemy and one piece of artillery. Pie 
took possession of the bridge and destroyed it. 

Sigel's force advanced again on the left this morning, and when last 
heard from was pursuing the enemy in the direction of Waterloo 
Bridge. His column was being shelled from the opposite bank of 
the liver, which is still too deep to be forded. The enemy has made 
no advance against Rappahannock Station since we left, though yes- 
terday morning while we were withdrawing our forces from the oppo- 
site side of the river, he brought forward his columns of infantry and 
attempted to carry the heights we were leaving by storm. He was, 
however, repulsed with considerable loss. We have had a continuous 
engagement, principally with artillery, along the whole line of the 
river for eight or ten miles, during the last three days. 

No force of the enemy has yet been able to cross except that now 
enclosed by our forces between Sulphur Springs and Waterloo Bridge, 
which will no doubt be captured, unless they find some means, of 
which I know nothing, of escaping across the river between those 
places. 

Early to-morrow, after clearing this side of the river, I shall move 



61 

back a considerable part of this force to tbo neigbborbood of Rap- 
pahannock Station. By that time the river will doubtless be fordable 
again. I shall leave a corps of observation here to watch the cross- 
ings at Waterloo and Sulphur Springs. The forces arriving from 
Washington and Alexandria will be assembled, I think, on Lick- 
ing River, between Germantown and the railroad, with a reserve for 
the force at Warrenton, somewhere between Warrcnton Junction and 
this place — until you are ready to begin a forward movement. 

1 cannot form an estimate of the forces of the enemy. He has 
been developed in heavy force, by simultaneous reconnoissances, along 
a line of nine miles from the railroad crossing of the Rappahannock, 
as far, at least, as Sulphur Springs. I should like to have some idea 
of the forces which are coming here, and your plans of organizing 
them, that they may be assigned and posted in some order. 

Our losses during the last three days have been quite heavy, among 
the killed being Brig -Gen, Bohlen, commanding a brigade in Sigel's 
Corps. The whole tendency of the enemy since he appeared in I'ront 
of us at Rappahannock Station, has been toward our right, but how 
far his movement in that direction will extend, I am not able to say. 
I shall to-morrow remove my headquarters to some central point, prob- 
ably Warrenton Junction, 

John Pope, Major-General Commanding. 
A true copy : T, C, H. Smith, Lieut,-Col. and A. D. C. 



Headquarters Army of Virginia, ) 
Warrenton, Aug, 24th, 1862. j 
General: — To-night or at an early hour in the morning, you will 
please send spies and scouts around by Front Royal to Thornton's 
Gap, and into the Valley of the Shenandoah, to asceriaio whether 
any of the enemy's forces are moving in that direction. Send at least 
two or thi'ee reliable men fur that purpose, and instruct them that if 
they find any difficulty in returning to you they shall go into ^Vin- 
chester, and communicate their information to Gen. White. You will 
receive instructions as to your movements in the morning. 
By order of Gen. Pope. 

T. C. H. Smith, Lieut.-Col. and A. D. C 
Major-Gen. Sigel, Commanding. &c. 
A true copy : T. C, H. Smith, Lieut.-Col. and A. D. C. 



Headquarters First Corps Army of Virginia, ) 
Near Waterloo Bridge, Va., Aug. 24th, \ml. j 

Col. Geo. D. Rnggks, Chief of Staff Army of Vinjinia : — The 
First Corps is in bivouac at Waterloo Bridge, with the exception 
of an infantry brigade left at Sulphur Springs, as rear guard, to- 
gether with a brigade of Gen. Banks, and one of Gen. Reno. 

Gen. Banks' (Jorps is on the Sulphur Springs road, about four 
miles from the Springs, and Gen, Reno is at or near the fork of the 
Warrenton road. 

To judge from the appearance of the camp fires and camps, I am 



^2 

certain that the enemy's main army is encamped on the other side of 
the river, perhaps two miles from the river, with the advance at 
Amissville, and the rear opposite Sulphur Springs. 

(Signed) F. Sigel, Maj.-Gen. Commanding First Corps. 

A true copy : T. C. H. Smith, Lt.-Col. and A. D. C. 

Dispatches and Orders sent and deceived from Aug. loth, to Aug, 

^ith, inclusive. 

Headquarters Army of Virginia, ) 
August 25th, 1862. ( 

Major- General Hallech : — Your dispatch just received. Of course 
I shall be ready to re-cross the Rappahannock at a moment's notice. 
You will see Irom the positions taken that each army Corps is on the 
best roads across the river. You wished forty-eight hours to assemble 
the forces from the Peninsula behind the Rappahannock, and four 
days have passed without the enemy yet being permitted to cross. I 
don't think he is ready yet to do so. In ordinary dry weather the 
Rappahannock can be crossed almost anywhere, and these crossing 
places are best protected by concentrating at central positions to strike 
at any force which attempts to cross. 1 had clearly understood that 
you wislied to unite our whole forces before a forward movei:.ent was 
begun, and that I must take care to keep united with Buruside on my 
left, so that no movement to separate us could be made. This with- 
drew me lower down the Rappahannock than 1 wished to come. lam 
not acquainted with your views, as you seem to suppose, and would be 
glad to know them as far as my own position and operations are con- 
cerned. I understood you clearly that at all hazards I was to prevent 
the enemy from passing the Rappahannock. This I have done and 
shall do. I don't like to be on the defensive if I can help it, but must 
be so as long as I am tied to Burnside's forces, not yet wholly arrived 
at Fredericksburg. Please let me know, if it can be done, Avhat is to 
be my own conunand, and if I am to act independently against the 
enemy. 1 certainly understood that, as soon as the whole of our forces 
were concentrated, you designed to take command in person, and that, 
when every thing was ready, we were to move forward in concert. I 
judge from the tone of your dispatch that you are dissatisfied with 
something. PTuIess I know what it is, of course, I can't correct it. 
The troops arriving here come in fragments. Am I to assign them to 
Brigades and Corps ? I would suppose not, as several of the new 
regiments coming have been assigned to Army Corps directly from 
your office. In case I commence offensive operations I must know 
what tbrces I am to take, and what you wish left, and what connec- 
tion must be kept up with Burnside, It has been my purpose to con- 
form my operations to your plans, yet I was not informed when Mc- 
Clellan evacuated Harrison's, so that I might know what to expect in 
that direction ; and Avhen I say these things, in no complaining spirit, 
I think you know well that I am anxious to do everything to advance 
your plans of campaign. I understood that this Army was to 
maintain the line of the Rappahuunock until all the forces from the 



53 

Peninsula had united behind that river. I have done eo. I under- 
stood distinctly that I was not to hazard anything except for this pur- 
pose, as delay was what was wanted. 

The eneiuy this rooming has pushed a considerable infantry force 
up opposite Waterloo Bridge, and is planting batteries, and long lines 
of his infantry are moving up from Jeffersonville towards Sulphur 
Springs- His whole force, as far as can be ascertained, is massed in 
front of me, from railroad crossing of Kappahannock around to Wat- 
erloo Bridge, their main body being opposite Sulphur Springs. 

(Signed) John Pope, Major-Greneral. 

A true copy : T. C. H. Smith, Lieut.-Col., and A. J). C. 

[Extract.] 
United Sx.vrEis Milit.'vry TELEGRAni, ) 

Received Aug. 26, 1862 — from War Department il:45 a.m. J 
To Maj.-Gen. Fupe : — Not the slightest dissatisfaction has been felt 
in regard to your operations on the Kappahannock. Ttie main object 
has been accomplished in getting up troops from the Peninsula, al- 
though they have been delayed by storms. Moreover, the telegraph 
has been interrupted, leaving us for a time ignorant of the progress of 
the evacuation. * * '•= * * * * * 

(Signed.) II. W. Halleck, Gen.-in-Chief. 

A true coj^y: T. (J. 11. Smith, Lieut.-Col. and A. D. C. 

Headquarters Third Corps, ] 
Aug. 25—11:25 a. m. J 
Col. Ruggles, A. A. G. and Oliief of Slajf — Colonel: — Inclosed 
you will please find reports of Col. Claik, A. D. C, from the Signal 
Corps Station, of the movements of tiie enemy on the south side of 
Hedgeman or Rappahannock River. The facts are reported as having 
been observed by himself, and can be relied upon as being as near the 
truth as the distance will permit. It seems to be apparent that the 
enemy is threatening, or moving upon the Valley of the Shenandoah 
via Front Royal, with designs upon the Potomac — possibly bevond. 
Not knowing whether you have received this information, I forward it 
for the consideration of the Commanding General. 

Respectfully, c^c, N. P. Banks, M.-G. C 
A true copy: T. C H. Smith, Lieut.-Col. and A. D. C 

Warrenton Junction, } 
August 25, 1862—9.30 p. m. | 

MaJ. Gen. Si'fjel, Commanding \st Corps : — You will force the pas- 
sage of the river at Waterloo Bridge to-morrow morning at day light, 
and see what is in front of you. 1 do not believe there is any enemy 
in force there, but do believe that the whole of their army has marched 
to the west and northwest. 

I am not satisfied either with your reports or your operations of to- 
day, and expect to hear to-morrow early something more satisfactory 
concerning the enemy. Send back and bring up your provision trains 



51 

to your command, but no regimental trains or baggage of any descrip- 
tion. You will consider this a positive order, to be obeyed literally. 

You will communicate with me by telegraph from Warrentou. 

John Pope, Major-General Commanding. 

Sent in the care of Gen. McDowell, at Warrenton. 
A true copy : T. C H. Smith, Lt.-Col. and A. D. G. 



Waruenton Junction, ) 

Aug. 25, 1862— 9:S0 p. m. ( 

Maj.-Gen. McDowell, Warrenton: — I believe that the whole force 
of the enemy has marched for the Shenandoah Valley, by way of Lu- 
ray and Front Royal. The column which has marched to-day toward 
Gaines' Cross Roads has turned north, and when last seen was passing 
under the east base of Buck Mountain, toward Salem and Rectortovrn. 
I desire you, as early as possible in the morning, holding Reynolds in 
reserve at Warrenton or vicinity, to make a reconnoissauce with your 
whole Corps, and ascertain what is beyond the river at Sulphur 
Springs. 

There is no force of the enemy between here and Culpepper, or at 
Culpepper. 

I send you a dispatch for Gen. Sigel, which please read and send 
to him immediately. 

Communicate with me frequently by telegraph from Warrenton. 
John Pope, JMajor-General Commanding. 
A true copy : T. C. H. Smith, Lieut -Col. and A. D. C. 



United States Military Telegraph, \ 
Received August 26, 18li2, \- 

From Headquarters Third Corps, o:3J p. m., Warrenton. ) 
To Maj.-Gen. Fopc : — Gen. Sigel's bridge train has arrived. I 
think it may be useful. Gen. Milroy burned the bridge at Waterloo 
before he retired from that place last night, and Buford says the fords 
near Waterloo are bad. I have directed the available forces of Sigel's 
cavalry, with a section of his artillery, to report to Geo. Buford this 
afternoon on the Waterloo Road, with three day's cooked rations. I 
have directed Buford to march at dawn to-morrow toward Chester Gap, 
to ascertain what direction the enemy have taken on our right, wheth- 
er to Rectortown or Front Royal, through Chester Gap. He will 
either take the Carter Cliurch Road, up the left bank of Carter's 
Run, or the road direct from this place to Chester Gap, as inquiries to 
be made this p. m. shall determine However persons may have dif- 
fered as to the force at Waterloo, Sulpliur Springs, or elsewhere, all 
agree in one thing — the movement of the enemy toward our right from 
Rappahannock to Waterloo. Battalions, trains, batteries, all have the 
same direction. The force of the enemy now seems to be above Sul- 
phur Springs. Under these views, in addition to Sigel's Corps, now 
here, I beg to suggest that Hooker and Kearney be marched at once 
in this direction, instead of the direction of Rappahannock Station, 
for, whether we attack them, or they attack us, the contest must come 



55 

off, it seems to me, as tilings now stand, above rather than helow Snl- 
pliur Springs. If they could make a march this p. m. toward either 
Sulphur Springs or Waterloo Bridge, it would be a movement I think 
in the right direction. "What is the enemy's purpose is not easy to 
discover. Some have thought he means to march around our right 
through Eectortown to Washington. Others think that he intends 
going down the Shenandoah, either through Thornton's or Chester 
Grap. Either of these operations .'■eems to me too hazardous for him 
to undertake, with us in his rear and flank. Others that it was his 
object to throw his trains around into the Valley, to draw his supplies 
from that direction, and have his front looking to the east rather tnan 
to the north. It is also thought that while a portion of his force has 
marched up the immediate right bank of the Kappahaunock, a larger 
portion has gone through Culpepper up the Spcrryville road. No 
doubt these various suppositions may have occurred to you, but I have 
thought it not inappropriate to recapitulate them here with reference 
to the concentration of forces in this direction, which I have herein 
suggested. Cannonading at Sulphur Springs still continues about the 
same. I have ordered Buford to send you a regiment of cavalry. I 
can't get hold of Bayard. 

[Signed.] Irwin McDowell. 

I have just received your telegrams of 2-20 and 3-15 p. m. I trust 
that Buford's reconnoissance to-morrow will obtain the information 
you desire concerning the movements of the enemy across the Spcrry- 
ville Pike, in the direction of Gaines' Cross-roads and Salem. I also 
received from Gen. Banks' signal officer the account of this move- 
ment. With reference to your inquiries as to what has occurred to 
make the presence of Cox here desirable, I made the suggestion, first, 
because in the general order issued, he was ordered to join Sigel at 
Fayetteville. As Sigel was here, and, as I understood, Cox was ar- 
riving in the cars, I thought if it could be done, time would be gained 
by his being landed here rather than at Warrenton Junction. 

(Signed) Irwin McDowell, Maj.-Geu. Comd'g. 

A true copy : T. C. 11. Smith, Lieut.-Col. and A. D. C. 



United States Military Telegraph, ) 

Rec'd Aug. 26, 1862. From near Waterloo Bridge, 3-45 p. m. \ 

To General Pojie : — Trains and troops still passing over the same 
route. A deserter just come in says, Longstreet's Corps, embracing 
Anderson's, Jones', Kemper's, Whitney's and Evans' Divisions, are 
located in the woods back of Waterloo Bridge; think Hill's Division 
at Jefferson, Jackson's Corps somewhere above Longstreet's. He ap- 
pears truthful, and I credit his story. The entire district from Jeff- 
erson to Culpepper, Spcrryville, and as far as Barber's, covered with 
smoke and lines of dust. The deserter reports the arrival last even- 
ing of the greater portion of Longstreet's Corps at its present position. 

(Signed) John S. Clark, Col. and A. D. C. 

A true copy : T. C. H. Smith, Lieut.-Col. and A. D. C. 



1^ 

Headquarters Third Corps, } 

WarrentoD, Aug. 26th. — 9 p. in. \ 
Major General Pope : — An intelligent negro has just come in to 
Gen. Euford from White Plains, and reports the advance of the ene- 
my's column at that place, lie says he saw himself at that place to- 
day, at 12 o'clock, two batteries of artillery, two regiments of cavalry, 
fuur regiments of infantry, and that they were moving in the direc- 
tion of Thoroughfare Gap. The man's story is evidently to be relied 
upon. Gen. IJuford says his statements are confirmed by his scouts, 
who report larye trains passing uji tbrough Orleans to "White Plains. 

(Signed) Irwin McDowell, Major-Gen. 

True copy : John Pope, Major General. 



Wakrenton Junction, ) 
Aug. 26th, 1862—8 p.m. } 

Major General McDoicell, Warrenton : — Fitz John Porter, with 
Sykes' and Morcil's Divisions, will be within two miles and a half of 
Warrenton, on the Fayettcville road, to-morrow night. See if you 
cannot have the cross-roads repaired so that he can get from his posi- 
tion into the Sulphur Springs road with his artillery, if he should be 
needed. Will use all efforts to have Sturgis and Cox within three 
miles of you to-morrow night, and have requested Geu. Ilaileck to push 
forward Franklin at once, carrying his baggage and supplies by rail- 
road to the point where the Manassas Gap railroad intersects the War- 
renton Turnpike. 

From that position he can either advance to your support or prevent 
your right from being turned from the direction of the JManassas Gap 
Eailroad. I think our fight should be made at Warreuton, and if you 
can postpone it for two days everything will be right. 

John Pope, Major-General Commanding. 
A true copy : T. C H. Smith, Lieut.-Col. and A. D. 0. 



Headquarters Army of Virginia, ) 
Warrenton Junction. Aug 26th, 1862 — 8:20 p. m. j 
Maj.-Gen. HciiUzelman, ConimanJiiir/, dijc. : — The Major Gener- 
al commanding the Army of Virginia directs me to send you the in- 
closed communication, and to request that you put a regiment on a 
train of cars, and send it down immediately to Manassas, to ascertain 
what has occurred, repair the telegraph wires, and protect the rail- 
road there till further orders. 

With great respect, General, your obedient servant, 
(Signed) T. C. II. Smith, Lieut.-Col. and A. D. C. 

A true copy : T. C II. Smith, Lieut.-Col. and A. D. C. 



Headquarters Army of Virginia, ) 
August 26, 1862—12 p. m. \ 

Gen McDowell: — Gen. Sigcl reports the enemy's rear guard at 
Orleans to-night, with his main force encamped at White Plains. You 
will please ascertain very early in the morniug whether this is so, 



57 

and have the whole of your command in readiness to march. You 
had best ascertain it to-night, if you possibly can. Our communi- 
cations have been interrupted by the enemy's cavalry, near Man- 
assas. Whether his whole force, or the larger part of it, has gone 
round, is a question which we must settle instantly. And no por- 
tion of his force must march opposite to us, to-night, without our 
knowing it. I telegraphed you an hour or two ago, what disposi- 
tions I had made, supposing the advance through Thoroughfare to 
be a column of not more than ten or fifteen thousand men. If 
his whole force, or the larger part of it, has gone, we must know 
it at once. The troops here have no artillery, and if the main 
forces of the enemy are still opposite to you, you must send for- 
ward to G-reenwich to be there to-morrow evening with two bat- 
teries of artillery, or three if you can get them, to meet Kearney. 
We must know at a very early hour in the morning, so as to 
determine our plans. 

(Signed) John Pope, Major-General. 

A true copy: T. C. H. Smith, Lieut.-Col. and A. D. C. 

Headquartbes Army of Virginia, ) 

Warrenton Junction, August 27, 1862. 3 

General Orders No. -. — The following movement of troops will 
be made, viz : 

Major-Gen. McDowell with his own and Sigel's Corps, and the 
Divisions of Brig.-Gen. Keynolds, will pursue the turnpike from 
Warrenton to Gainesville, if possible, to-night. 

The Army Corps of Gen. Heintzelman, with the detachment of 
the Ninth Corps under Maj.-Gen. Reno leading, will take the road 
from Catlett's Station to Greenwich, so as to reach there to-night 
or early in the morning. Maj.-Gen. Eeno will immediately com- 
municate with Maj.-Gen. McDowell, and his command as well as 
that of Maj.-Gen. Heintzelman, will support Maj.-Gen. McDowell 
in any operations against the enemy. 

Maj.-Gen. Fitz John. Porter will remain at Warrenton Junction 
till he is relieved by Maj.-Gen. Banks, when he will immediately 
push forward with his Corps in the direction of Greenwich and 
Gainesville, to assist the operations on the right wing. 

Major-Gen. Banks, as soon as he arrives at Warrenton Junction, 
will assume the charge of the trains, and cover their movement toward 
Manassas Junction. The train of his own corps, under escort of 
two regiments of infantry and a battery of artillery, will pursue the road 
south of the railroad, which conducts into the rear of Manassas Junc- 
tion. As soon as all the trains have passed Warrenton Junction, he 
will take post behind Cedar Run, covering the fords and bridges of 
that stream, and holding his position as long as possible. He will cause 
all the railroad trains to be loaded with the public and private stores now 
here, and run them back toward Manassas Junction as far as the railroad 
is practicable. Wherever a bridge is burned, so as to prevent the further 
passage of the railroad trains, he will assemble them all as near together 



58 

as possible, and protect them with his command until the bridges are 
rebuilt. If the enemy is too strong before him, before the bridge is 
repaired, he will be careful to destroy entirely the trains, locomotives, 
and stores before he falls back in the direction of Manassas Junction. 
He is, however, to understand that he is to defend his position as long 
as possible, keeping himself in constant communication with Major 
Gen. Porter on his right. If any sick, now in hospital at Warrenton 
Junction, are not provided for, and able to be transported, he will 
have them loaded into the wagon train of his own corps (even should 
this necessitate the destruction of much baggage and regimental pro- 
perty), and carried to Manassas Junction. The very important duty 
devolved upon Major-Gen. Banks, the Major-General commanding 
the army of Virginia feels assured that he will discharge with intel- 
ligence, courage and fidelity. 

The General Headquarters will be with the corps of Gen. Heintzel- 
man until further notice. 

By command of Major-Gen. Pope. 

Geo. D. Ruggles, Colonel and Chief of Staff. 
A true copy: T. C. H. Smith, Lieut.-Col. and A. D. C. 

Headquarters Army op Virginia, | 
Aug. 27, 1862, 6:30 p. m., Bristow Station, j 

Maj.-Gen. F. J. Porter, Warrentoii Junction. — General: — The 
Major-General commanding directs that you start at 1 o'clock to-night, 
and come forward with your whole Corps, or such part of it as is with 
you, so as to be here by daylight to-morrow morning. Hooker has 
had a very severe action with the enemy with a loss of about three 
hundred killed and wounded. The enemy has been driven back but 
is retiring along the railroad. We must drive him from Manassas and 
clear the country between that place and Gainesville, where McDowell 
is. If Morrill has not joined you, send him word to push forward im- 
mediately ; also, send word to Banks to hurry forward with all speed 
to take your place at Warrenton Junction. It is necessary on all ac- 
counts that you should be here by daylight. I send an officer with 
this dispatch who will conduct you to this place. Be sure to send word 
to Banks, who is on the road from Fayetteville, probably in the direc- 
tion of Bealton. Say to Banks, also, that he had best run back the 
railroad train to this side of Cedar Run. If he is not with you write 
him to that effect. 

By command of Gen. Pope, 

Geo, D. Ruggles, Col. and Chief of Staff. 

p. S. — If Banks is not at Warrenton Junction, leave a regiment of 
infantry and two pieces of artillery as a guard till he comes up, with 
instructions to follow you immediately upon his doing so. 

If Banks is not at the Junction instruct Col. Clary to run the trains 
back to this side of Cedar Run, and post a regiment and a section of 
artillery with it. 

By command of Gen. Pope. 

Geo D. Ruggles, Col. and Chief of Staff. 
A true copy: T. C. H. Smith, Lieut.-Col. and A. P. C. 



59 

Headquarters, Bristow, Aug. 27, 1862 — 9 p. m. 
Major- General Kearney : — At the very earliest blush of dawn push 
forward with your command with all speed to this place. You cannot 
be more than three or four miles distant. Jackson, A. P. Hill and 
Ewell are in front of us. Hooker has had a severe fight with them 
to-day. McDowell marches upon Manassas Junction from Gainesville 
to-morrow at daybreak. Reno upon the same place at the same hour. 
I want you here at day-dawn, if possible, and we shall bag the whole 
crowd. Be prompt and expeditious, and never mind wagon trains or 
roads till this affair is over. Lieut. Brooks will deliver you this com- 
munication. He has one for Gen..E,eno and one for Gen. McDowell. 
Please have these dispatches sent forward instantly by a trusty staff 
officer, who will be sure to deliver them without fail, and make him 
bring back a receipt to you before daylight. Lieut. Brooks will re- 
main with you and bring you to this camp. Use the cavalry I send 
you to escort your staff officer to McDowell and Reno. 

John Pope, Major-General Commanding. 
A true copy: T. C. H. Smith, Lieut.-Col. and A. D. C 



Headquarters, Army of Virginia, | 
Bristow Station, Aug. 22d, 1862 — 9 o'clock p. m. j 
Major- General McDoxoell : — At daylight to-morrow morning march 
rapidly on Manassas Junction with your whole force, resting your 
right on the Manassas Gap Railroad, throwing your left well to the 
east, Jackson, Ewell and A. P. Hill are between Gainesville and 
Manasass Junction. We had a severe fight with them to-day, dri- 
ving them. back several miles along the railroad. If you will march 
promptly and rapidly at the earliest dawn of day upon Manassas 
Junction, we shall bag the whole crowd. I have directed Reno to 
march from Greenwich at the same hour upon Manassas Junction, and 
Kearney, who is in his rear, to march on Bristow at daybreak. Be 
expeditious and the day is our own. 

John Pope, Major-Gencral Commanding. 
A true copy : T. C. H. Smith, Lieut.-Col. and A. D. C. 



Headquarters Army of Virginia, 
Bristow Station, Aug. 28, 1862—10:40 a. m. 
Maj.-Gen. Banks, Warrenton Ju7iction — General: — Maj .-General 
Pope directs me to say that as soon as the railroad trains and all pub- 
lic property shall have been safely run back from Warrenton Junction 
you will move your command back to Kettle Run Bridge, where you 
will find the railroad obstructed and the railroad trains stopped. 

You will there take the same measures to save the public property 

from attack by the enemy as directed in copy of General Orders from 

these headquarters, sent to you yesterday through Maj.-Gen. Porter. 

I am. General, very respectfullv, your ob't serv't, 

(Signed.) Geo. D. Ruggles, Col. and Chief of Staff- 

A true copy : T. C. H. Smith, Lt.-Col. and A. D. C 



60 

Headquarters Army of Virginia, ) 
Bristow Station, Aug. 28, 1862—10:50 a. m. j" 
Col, Clary, Chief Quartermaster Army of Virginia: — Maj.-Gen. 
Pope directs that all the wagon trains be kept closed up and close in 
rear of the troops. You will accordingly give instructions to the va- 
rious subordinate Quartermasters, including Regimental Quartermas- 
ters, to keep their trains closed and immediately in rear of the troops. 
Please see that this order is executed. 

By command of Maj.-G-en. Pope. 
(Signed.) Geo. D. Ruggles, Col. and Chief of Staff. 

A true copy : T. C. H. Smith, Lieut.-Col. and A. D. C. 



Headquarters, Army of Virginia, ) 

Bristow Station, Aug. 28, 1862—11 a. m. J 
Surgeon 3fcParlin, 3Iedicnl Director Army of Virginia — Sir : — 
Maj.-Gen. Pope directs that you take measures to hunt up the wound- 
ed of the enemy, and to provide for them the same as for our own 
soldiers. I am, Sir, very respectfully, your ob't serv't, 

(Signed.) Geo. D. Ruggles, Col. and Chief of Staff. 

A true copy : T. C H. Smith, Lieut.-Col. and A. D. C 



Headquarters Army of Virginia, | 
Bristow Station, Aug. 28, 1862—11:10 a. m. j 
Lieut. F. J. SJmnkj Chief of Ordnance, Army of Virginia : — 
The Major-General Commanding directs that one or two boxes of am- 
munition be thrown into every wagon that passes the railroad train 
where the ammunition now is, no matter to whom the wagon or wag- 
on train belongs. 

By Command of Maj.-Gen. Pope. 
(Signed.) Geo. D. Ruggles, Col. and Chief of Staff. 

A true copy : T. C. H. Smith, Lieut.-Col. and A. D. C. 



Headquarters, Army of Virginia, ") 
Aug. 28, 1862. j 
Special Order No, -, — The trains will come forward in the fol- 
lowing order, viz : 

1st. Heintzelman's. 3d. Sigel's. 

2d. McDowell's. 4th. Porter's. 

All the supply and regimental trains will be sent forward to this 
place as rapidly as possible — ammunition being forwarded in advance 
of all other supplies. 

By command of Maj.-Gen. Pope. 
(Signed.) Geo. D. Ruggles, Col. and Chief of Staff. 

A true copy : T. C H. Smith, Lieut.-Col., and A. D. C 



Headquarters Army of Virginia, ] 
Bristow Station, Aug. 28, 1862—11:20 a. m. J 
Col. Clary, Chief Quartermaster Army of Virginia: — The Major- 
General commanding directs that one or two boxes of ammunition be 



61 

ttrown into every wagon ttat passes the railroad train where the am- 
munition now is, no matter to whom the wagon or wagon train be- 
longs. He also directs that the railroad trains be unloaded into the 
passing wagon trains in the same manner, commencing first to unload 
the ammunition as hereinbefore directed. 

By command of Major-Glen. Pope. 
(Signed.) Geo. D. Ruggles, Col. and Chief of Staff. 

A true copy: T. C H. Smith, Lieut.-Col. and A. D. C. 



Headquarters Army of Virginia, ) 
Manassas Junction, Aug. 28, 1862 — 1:20 p. m, J 
Maj.- General McDoivell: — I sent you a dispatch a few minutes 
ago directing you to move on Gum Springs to intercept Jackson. 
Since then I have received your note of this morning. I will this 
evening push forward Reno to Gainesville, and follow with Heintzel- 
man, unless there is a large force of the enemy at Centreville, which 
I do not believe. Ascertain if you can about this. I do not wish 
you to carry out the order to proceed to Gum Spring if you consider 
it too hazardous, but I will support you in any way you suggest, 
by pushing forward from Manassas Junction across the turnpike. 
Jackson has a large train which should certainly be captured. Give 
me your views fully. You know the country much better than I 
do. Come no further in this direction with your command but call 
back what has advanced thus far. 

John Pope, Maj .-Gen. Commanding. 
A true copy : T. C. H. Smith, Lt.-Col. and A. D. C 



Headquarters, Army op Virginia, near Bull Run, \ 
Aug. 28, 1862—9:50 p. m. \ 
Major- Geii. Kearney — General: — Gen. McDowell has intercept- 
ed the retreat of the enemy and is now in his front, Sigel on the right 
of McDowell. Unless he can escape by by-paths leading to the north 
to-night he must be captured. I desire you to move forward at 1 o'- 
clock to-night, even if you can carry with you no more than 2000 men, 
though I trust you will carry the larger part of your division. Pursue 
the turnpike from Centreville to Warrenton. The enemy is not more 
than three and a half miles from you. Seize any of the people of the 
town to guide you. Advance cautiously and drive in the enemy's 
pickets to-night, and at early dawn attack him vigorously. Hooker 
shall be close behind you. Extend your right well toward the north 
and push forward your right wing well in the attack. Be sure to 
march not later than one, with all the men you can take. 

John Pope, Major-General Commanding. 
A true copy: T. C. H. Smith, Lieut.-Col. and A. D. C. 

Headquarters Army of Virginia, near Bull Run, \ 

Aug. 28, 1862— 10 p. m. J 
Major-General Eeintzelman, — General: Gen. McDowell has in- 
tercepted the retreat of the enemy. Sigel is immediately on his right, 



62 

and I see no possibility of his escape. I have instructed Kearney to 
push forward cautiously at 1 o'clock to-night until he drives in the 
pickets of the enemy and to assault him vigorously at daylight in the 
morning. It is of the last importance that Hooker should be close in 
his rear. I desire, therefore, that Hooker shall march at 3 o'clock to 
night, taking the turnpike from Centre ville toWarrenton, and resting 
on that road 1} miles beyond Centreville, as reserve for Kearney. — 
Send a copy of this dispatch to Hooker immediately, and I beg you 
particularly to see that Hooker marches at the hour specified, even if 
he should have to do so with one-half of his men. I shall rely upon 
this. John Pope, Major-General Commanding. 

A true copy : T. C. H. Smith, Lt.-Col. and A. D. C. 



Dispatches and Orders sent and received from Aug. 29, to Sept. 2 

Inclusive. 
Headquarters, Army of Virginia, near Bull Run ) 

Aug. 29, 1862—3 a. m. } 
Maj.-Gen. Portei — General: — McDowell has intercepted the re- 
treat of Jackson. Sigel is immediately on the right of McDowell. — 
Kearney and Hooker march to attack the enemy's rear at early dawn. 
Major-G-en. Pope directs you to move upon Centreville at the first 
dawn of day with your whole command, leaving your trains to follow. 
It is very important that you should be here at a very early hour in 
the morning. A severe engagement is likely to take place, and your 
presence is necessary. 

I am, General, very respectfully, your ob't serv't. 

Geo D. Ruggles, Col. and Chief of Staff. 
A true copy : T. C. H. Smith, Lt.-Col. and A. D. C. 



Headquarters Army of Virginia, near Bull Run, ) 

August 29, 1862—5 a. m. \ 
Maj.-Gen. Reno — General: — I sent you some verbal orders by Col. 
Smith last night. Kews from the front received since makes it neces- 
sary to modify them. You will accordingly move rapidly on Centre- 
ville by the road past these headquarters. Upon arriving at Centre- 
ville you will take the turnpike toward Warrenton, and push for- 
ward rapidly. You will find the whole corps of Hcintzelman in front 
of you. Pass his stragglers and keep well up with his command — 
pushing rapidly toward any heavy firing you may hear. 

Jno. Pope, Maj.-Gen., Commanding. 
A true copy : T. C. H. Smith, Lieut.-Col. and A. D. C. 



Headquarters, Army of Virginia, \ 
Centreville,Aug. 30, 1862. J 
General Order No. 5. — Gens, McDowell and Porter: — You will 
please move forward with your joint commands toward Gainesville. I 
sent Gen. Porter written orders to that effect an hour and a half ago. 
Heintzelman, Sigel and Reno are moving on the Warrenton turnpike, 
and must now be not far from Gainesville. I desire that, as soon as 



63 

communication is established between this force and your own, the 
whole command shall halt. It may be necessary to fall back behind 
Bull Run, at Centre ville to-night. I presume it will be so, on account 
cf our supplies. I have sent no orders of any description to Ricketts, 
and none to interfere in any way with the movements of McDowell's 
troops, except what I sent by his Aid-de-Camp last night, which 
were to hold his position on the Warrenton pike, until the troops from 
here should fall upon the enemy's flank and rear. I do not even know 
Ricketts' position, as I have not been able to find out where Gen. Mc- 
Dowell was until a late hour this morning. Gen. McDowell will take 
immediate steps to communicate with Gen. Ricketts, and instruct him 
to rejoin the other divisions of his corps as soon as practicable. If any 
considerable advantages are to be gained by departing from this order, 
it will not be strictly carried out. One thing must be had in view, 
that the troops must occupy a position from which they can reach Bull 
Run to-night or by morning. The indications are that the whole 
force of the enemy is moving in this direction at a pace that will bring 
them here by to-morrow night or next day. My own headquarters 
will be for the present with Heintzelman's Corps, or at this place. 

(Signed) John Pope, Major-General Commanding. 

A true copy : T. C. H. Smith, Lieut.-Col. and A. D. C. 



Headquarters in the Field, \ 
Aug. 29,-4-30 p. m. j 

Major General Porter : — Your line of march brings you in on the 
enemy's right flank. I desire you to push forward into action at once 
on the enemy's flank, and if possible on his rear, keeping your right in 
communication with Gen. Reynolds. The enemy is massed in the 
woods in front of us, but can be shelled out as soon as you engage 
their flank. Keep heavy reserves and use your batteries, keeping well 
closed to your right all the time. In case you are obliged to fall back, 
do so to your right and rear so as to keep you in close communication 
with the right wing. 

John Pope, Major-General Commanding. 
A true copy: T. C. H. Smith, Lieut-Col. A. D. C 



Headquarters Army of Virginia, ) 
In the field, Aug. 29th, 1862—5 p. m. J 
Major General Banks — General: — I would prefer that you send 
your trains direct to Manassas Junction and Centreville. The road is 
clear, and there is no difficulty about it. Send them through as soon 
as you can. Send back working parties to try and get the railroad in 
sufficiently good order, that the trains may be worked back to Bull 
Run. This is of the last importance, and you cannot get it done too 
soon. Work night and day at it. 

(Signed) John Pope, Major-General Com'ding. 

A true copy : T. C. H. Smith, Lieut.-Col. and A. D. C 



64 

Headquarters, Army op Virginia, i 

In the field near Bull Run, Aug. 29, 1862—8-50 p. m. \ 
Major- General F. J. Porter — General: — Immediately upon the 
receipt of this order, the precise hour of receiving which you will ac- 
knowledge, you will march your command to the field of battle of to- 
day, and report to me in person for orders. You are to understand 
that you are expected to comply strictly with this order, and to be 
present on the field within three hours after its receipt, or after 
daybreak to-morrow morning. 

John Pope, Major-Greueral Commanding. 
A true copy : T. C. H. Smith, Lieut. -Col. and A. D. C. 

To Commanding Officer at Centreville : — I have been instructed 
by Gren. McClellan to inform you that he will have all the available 
wagons at Alexandria loaded with rations for your troops, and all of 
the cars, also, as soon as you will send in a cavalry escort to Alexan- 
dria as a guard to the train, 

August 29, 1862—8 p. m. 

Respectfully, W. B. Franklin, Maj.-Gen, Com'dg 6th Corps. 
A true copy : T. C. H. Smith, Lieut.-Col. and A. D. C 



Bull Run, ) 

Aug. 30th, 1862—6-30 a. m. } 
Col. Clary, Chief Quartermaster, Army of Va. — Colonel: — You 
will immediately send to Alexandria an ofiicer to bring out all sup- 
plies of forage and stores — forage particularly — required for this com- 
mand. The stores will be brought to Fairfax by rail, and thence by 
wagon to Centreville. The officers sent by you will obtain from the 
commanding officer at Alexandria the escort necessary to protect the 
trains. 

By command of Gen, Pope. 

Geo. D. Ruggles, Col. and Chief of Staff". 
A true copy : T. C. H. Smith, Lieut.-Col. and A. D. C. 

Headquarters Army of Virginia, } 
Battle-field near Groveton, Aug. 30th, 1862 — 9 a. m. J 
Col. Clary, Chief Quartermaster Army of Virginia: — Maj. 
Gen. Pope directs that you send two hundred and fifty (250) wag- 
ons to Major-General Banks, in order that he may remove his sick, 
and public property from his present position to Centreville or vicin- 
ity. I am. Colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

(Signed) Geo. D. Ruggles, Col. and Chief of Staflf. 

A true copy : T. C H. Smith, Lieut.-Col. and A. D. C. 



Headquarters Army op Virginia, ) 
Near Groveton, Aug. 30th. J 

Col. Beckwitli, Chief Commissary Colonel : — Gen. Pope directs 
that all the wagons at Centreville be unloaded there, and the proper- 



65 

ty stored. The wagons will then be sent to Sangster's Station to 
haul subsistence stores from that place to Centreville. 
By command of Maj.-G-en. Pope. 
[Signed] Geo. D. Ruggles, Col. and Chief of Staff. 

A true copy: T. C H. Smith, Lt.-Col. and A. J). C. 

Headquarters, Army of Virginia, 
Aug. 30th, 1862—6 p. m. 
Gen. FranJdin : — Post your command, and whatever other troops 
you can collect, and put them in the fortifications at, and other strong 
positions around, Centreville, and hold those positions to the last ex- 
tremity. 

By command of Gen. Pope. 

Geo. D. Buggies, Col. and Chief of Staff. 
A true copy : T. C. H. Smith, Lieut-Col. and A. D. C. 



August 30th— 6-45 p. m. 
Col. Clary : — You will immediately put all the wagons, and every- 
thing that interferes with the range of artillery from the works at 
Centreville, a good distance to the rear, on the other side of the town 
— out of range of artillery from the works. 
By command of Maj.-Gen. Pope. 
(Signed) Geo. D. Ruggles, Col. and Chief of Staff. 

A true copy : T. C. H. Smith, Lieut.-Col. and A. D. C. 



August 30th, 1862—3 p. m. 
Gen. Heintzelman — [To be opened and read by Gens. Kearney and 
Hooker,] — General: — Retire to Centreville to-night with your com- 
mand. If possible go by the 'way of Sudley's Ford. Gen. Reno 
commands the rear guard on the turnpike by which the balance of the 
army will fall back. Upon your arrival at Centreville, you will assem- 
ble your command on the north side of that town. Early in the 
morning proper positions will be assigned you. 
By command of Major-Gen. Pope. 
(Signed) Geo. D. Ruggles, Col. and Chief of Staff. 

A true copy : T. C. H. Smith, Lt.-Col. and,^. D. C. 

Headquarters army of Virginia, \ 
Centreville, Aug. 30, 1862. J 
Special Orders No. — .The prisoners of war now at this place will 
be sent to morrow to Washington City, under guard of one regiment 
of infantry, to be furnished for this purpose by Major-Gen. McDowell. 
By command of Major-General Pope, 
(Signed) Geo D. Ruggles, Col. and Chief of Staff. 

A true copy; T. C. H. Smith, Lieut.-Col. and A. D. C. 

Centreville, Aug. 30, 1862 — 9:45 p. m. 
Maj.-Gen. HaUeck, — Generalin Chief: — We have had a terrific 
battle again to-day. The enemy, largely re-enforced, assaulted our 
9 



66 

position early to-day. We held our ground firmly until 6 o'clock p. m., 
when the enemy, massing very heavy forces on our left, forced back 
that wing about half a mile. At dark we held that position. Under all 
the circumstances — both horses and men having been two days without 
food, and the enemy greatly outnumbering us — I thought it best to 
move back to this place at dark. The movement has been made in 
perfect order and without loss. The troops are in good heart and 
marched off the field without the least hurry or confusioc. Their 
conduct was very fine. The battle was most furious for hours, with- 
out cessation, and the losses on both sides very heavy. The enemy is 
badly whipped, and we shall do well enough. Do not be uneasy. — 
We will hold our own here. The labors and hardships of this army 
for two or three weeks have been beyond description. We have delayed 
the enemy as long as possible without losing the army. We have 
damaged him heavily, and I think the army entitled to the gratitude 
of the country. Be easy; everything will go well. 

[Signed] Jno. Pope, Major-Gleneral. 

P. S. — We have lost nothing — neither guns nor wagons. 



August 30, 1862—6:30 p. m. 
Gen. Banks : — Destroy the public property at Bristow, and fall back 
upon Centreville at once. Destroy all the railroad property. Your 
troops at Bristow will withdraw through Brentsville. Your troops at 
Manassas and between there and Bristow will withdraw to Centreville. 
By command of Major-Gen. Pope. 
(Signed,) Geo D. Buggies, Col. and Chief of Stafi". 

A true copy : T. C H. Smith, Lt.-Col. and A. D. C. 

Washinton, Aug. 31st, 1862 — 11 a. m. 
Major- Gen. Pope, — 3Ii/ dear General: — You have done nobly. — 
Don't yield another inch if you can avoid it. All reserves are being 
sent forward. Couch's Division goes to-day, part of it went to Sang- 
ter's Station last night with Franklin and Sumner, who must be now 
with you. Can't you renew the attack? I don't write more particu- 
larly for fear the dispatch will not reach you, I am doing all in my 
power for you and your noble army. God bless you and it. Send me 
news more often if possible. 

(Signed,) H. W. Halleck, Gen.-in- Chief 

A true copy : T. C. H. Smith, Lieut. -Col. and A. D. C 

Headquarters Army of Virginia. \ 
Camp near Centreville, Aug. 31, 1862. j 
(Circular. ) 
Commanders of Army Corps will forthwith establish suitable grand 
guards in front of the positions they respectively hold, and have out- 
posts thrown forward which shall furnish a line of sentinels covering the 
entire army. Those on the flanks will furnish a grand guard for the 



67 

flanks. Tlie advanced position this side of Cub Run will only be 
held as an outpost, and the division now there will be withdrawn. 
By command of Major-Gen. Pope. 
(Signed,) Geo D . Ruggles, Col. and Chief of Staff. 

A true copy : T. C. H. Smith, Lieut. Col. and A. D. C. 

(Circular to Corps Commanders.) 

Headquarters Army of Virginia, | 
Centreville, Aug. 31, 1862—8:30 a. m. j 
General: — The Major-General commanding the Army of Virginia 
directs me to instruct you to take measures immediately to bring for- 
ward and distribute ammunition for your command. 

1. Men should be selected to guide the wagons to the troops to be 
supplied, to report to Lieut.-Col. Smith, A. D. C, at these Headquar- 
ters'. 

2. A report of the amount and kind of ammunition required in your 
command should be made to Lieut.-Col Smith. 

3. Empty wagons should be collected and sent to report to Lieut.. 
Col. Smith, 

With great respect General, your obedient servant, 

[Signed] T. C H. Smith, Lieut.-Col. and A. D. C. 

A true copy : E. Haight, Capt. and A. D. C. 



Headquarters Army of Virginia, 
Centreville. Aug. 31, 1862. 
[Circular,] 

Commanding officers of Army Corps will send back to Alexandria 
all wagons appertaining to their trains, except those absolutely neces- 
sary to haul subsistence stores and ammunition from Fairfax Court- 
House to this place for their respective Corps. This movement will 
be under charge of Col. Clary, Chief Quartermaster, Army of Virginia. 
By command of Major-Gen. Pope. 
[Signed,] Geo. D. Ruggles, Col. and Chief of Staff. 

A true copy : T, C. H. Smith, Lieut.-Col. and A. D. C. 



Headquarters Army of Virginia, 
Centreville, Aug. 31st, 1862—10:45 o'clock a. m. 

Maj.-General Halleck, General-in-Chief : — Our troops are all here, 
and in position, though much used up and worn out. I think per- 
haps it would have been greatly better if Sumner and Franklin had 
been here three or four days ago; but you may rely upon our giving 
them as desperate a fight as I can force our men to stand up to. 

I should like to know whether you feel secure about Washington, 
should this army be destroyed. I shall fight it as long as a man will 
stand up to the work. You must judge what is to be done, having 
in view the safety of the Capital. 

The enemy is already pushing a cavalry reconnoissance in front of 
Cub Run, whether in advance of an attack to-day, I do not yet know. 
I send you this that you may know our position and my purpose. 
(Signed) John Pope, Major-General Commanding. 

A true copy : T. C. H. Smith, Lieut.-Col. and A. D. C. 



68 

Headquarters Army of Virginia, } 
Centreville, Aug. 31st, 1862. \ 

Special Orders No — . — Carrol's Brigade of Ricketts' Division will 
proceed at once to Fairfax Station, and take post as a guard for com- 
missary stores at that point. The commanding officer of these troops 
will report upon his arrival at Fairfax Station to Col. E. Gr. Beckwith, 
Chief Commissary Army of Virginia. 

By command of Major-Gren. Pope. 
(Signed) Geo. D. Buggies, Col. and Chief of Staff. 

A true copy : T. C. H. Smith, Lt.-Col. and A. D. C. 



Headquarters Army op Virginia, \ 
Centreville, August, 31st, 1862. J 
Commanding Officer Forces at Fairfax Court House, — Sir : — 
Maj.-Gen. Pope directs you at once to send two regiments of infantry 
and two pieces of artillery, to escort the wagon train now en route to 
Alexandria, as far as Cloud's Mills. 

I am, Sir, very respectfully your obedient servant, 
(Signed)' Geo. D. Buggies, Col. and Chief of Staff. 

A true copy : T. C. H. Smith, Lt.-Col. and A. D. C. 



Centreville, Aug. 31st. 
Dear General : — Your dispatch of 11 a. m. has been received, 
and I thank you for your considerate commendation. I would be glad 
to have it in such shape that the army might be acquainted with it. 
We shall fight to the last. The whole Secession Army engaged us 
yesterday. I had a letter from Lee this morning. Ewell is killed ; 
Jackson badly wounded ; other generals of less note wounded. The 
plan of the enemy will undoubtedly be to turn my flank. If he does 
so, he will have his hands full. My troops are in good heart. I need 
cavalry horses terribly. Send me ten thousand, in lots, and under 
strong escort. I have never yet received a single one. 

(Signed) John Pope, Major-General. 

A true copy : T. C H. Smith, Lieut.-Col., and A. D. C. 



Headquarters Army op Virginia, ) 
Camp near Centreville, Sept. 1, 1862 — 3 a. m. J 
Maj.-Gen, Sumner: — The reconnoitering party of cavalry which 
you sent out yesterday morning, under Capt. Haight, has, as I am in- 
formed, been captured by the enemy's cavalry. It is essential that 
your right be carefully watched. I desire you at daylight to push a 
reconnoissance of not less than one brigade, supported if necessary by 
a second, toward the north of your position, to the Little Biver turn- 
pike, and beyond. The direction of your reconnoissance should be as 
nearly due north as practicable, and should be pushed not less than five 
miles. It is of great importance that this reconnoissance should be 
made at an early hour in the morning. The orderly whom you sent to 



69 

me left me without any permission, so that I find it very difficult to 
find your headquarters. Please send him back. 

(Signed) John Pope, Maj.-Gen. Commanding. 

A true copy : T. C. H. Smith, Lieut.-Col. and A. D. C. 



Headquarteks Army of Virginia, ) 
Centreville, Sept. 1st, 1862. ) 
General: — The Major-General Commanding directs me to inform 
you that a large supply of ammunition has arrived since yesterday, 
say 120 wagons, and that near the earthwork, close in rear of Centre- 
ville, an officer will be found, charged with its distribution. The am- 
munition will be kept in the wagons in which it came, so as to be 
sent forward to the troops to be supplied immediately when required. 
Major-Greneral Commanding, &c., 

With great respect, General, your ob'dt serv't, 
(Signed) T. C. H. Smith, Lieut.-Col. and A. D. C 

A true copy : T. C. B. Smith, Lieut.-Col. and A. D. C. 

Headquarters Army of Virginia, ) 
September 1st — 5-45 a. m. j 

Major-General E. Y. Sumner^ — General: — The reconnoissance is 
only designed to ascertain whether there is any considerable move- 
ment of the enemy's infantry towards our right and rear. We have 
no cavalry — not a horse that can possibly perform service, and it may 
be necessary, in order to obtain the information I desire, to drive off" 
the enemy's cavalry. I do not care that the brigade shall be pushed 
further than the Little River Turnpike, while skirmishers are thrown 
still further, in order fully to ascertain whether the enemy is making 
any movement toward Germantown and Fairfax Court-House. I do 
not wish any engagement brought on at present on that ground, but 
when the information required shall have been obtained by the bri- 
gade, withdraw it. 

[Signed] Jno. Pope, Maj.-Gen. Commanding. 

A true copy : T. C. H. Smith, Lieut.-Col. and A. D. C. 



Headquarters of the Army, ) 

Washington, D. C, Sept. 1, 1862. \ 
Gen. Pope : — Yours of last evening was received at 4 a. m. this 
morning. I want to issue a complimentary order, but as you are 
daily fighting, it could hardly be distributed. I will do so very soon. 
Look out well for your right, and don't let the enemy get between 
you and the forts. We are strengthening the line of defence as ra- 
pidly as possible. Horses will be sent to you to-day. Send dispatches 
to me as often as possible. I hope for an arrival of caValry to-day. 
Yours truly, H. W. Halleck, Gen.-in-Chief, 

P. S. — Acknowledge hour of receipt of this. 
A true copy: T. C. H. Smith, Lieut.-Col. and A. D. C 



70 

Centreville, Sept. 1 — 8:50 a. m. 

Major- Gen. Halleck, General-in-Chief: — All was quiet yesterday 
and so far this morning. My men all resting. They need it much. 
Forage for our horses is being brought up. Our cavalry is completely 
broken down, so that there are not five horses to a company that can 
raise a trot. The consequence is that I am forced to keep considera- 
ble infantry along the roads in my rear to make them secure, and even 
then it is difficult to keep the enemy's cavalry off the roads. I shall 
attack again to-morrow if I can, the next day certainly. 

I think it my duty to call your attention to the unsoldierly and 
dangerous conduct of many brigade, and some division commanders 
of the forces sent here from the Peninsula. Every word and act and 
intention is discouraging, and calculated to break down the spirits of 
the men and to produce disaster. One commander of a corps who was 
ordered to march from Manassas Junction to join me near Groveton, 
although he was only five miles distant, failed to get up at all, and 
worse still, fell back to Manassas without a fight, and in plain hear- 
ing, at less than three miles distance, of a furious battle, which 
raged all day. It was only in consequence of peremptory orders that 
he joined me next day. One of his brigades, the Brigadier-Gene- 
ral of which professed to be looking for his Division, absolutely i-e- 
mained all day at Centreville, in plain view of the battle, and made 
no attempt to join. What renders the whole matter worse, these 
are both officers of the regular army, who do not hold back from 
ignorance or fear. Their constant talk, indulged in publicly and in 
promiscuous company, is that " the Army of the Potomac will not 
fight," that they are demoralized by withdrawal from the Peninsu- 
la, &c. When such example is set by officers of high rank, the 
influence is very bad among those in subordinate stations. 

You have hardly an idea of the demoralization among officers of 
high rank in the Potomac Army, arising in all instances from person- 
al feeling in relation to changes of Commander-in-Chief and oth- 
ers. These men are mere tools or parasites, but their example is 
producing, and must necessarily produce, very disastrous results. 
You should know these things, as you alone can stop it. Its source 
is beyond my reach, though its efi"ects are very perceptible and 
very dangerous. I am endeavoring to do all I can, and will most 
assuredly put them where they shall fight or run away. My ad- 
vice to you (I give it with freedom, as I know you will not misun- 
derstand it), is, that in view of any satisfactory results, you draw 
back this army to the intrenchments in front of Washington, and 
set to work in that secure place to reorganize and rearrange it. You 
may avoid great disaster by doing so. I do not consider the matter 
except in a purely military light, and it is bad enough and great 
enough to make some action very necessary. Where there is no 
heart in their leaders, and every disposition to hang back, much 
cannot be expected from the men. 

Please hurry forward cavalry horses to me under strong escort. I 
tieed them badly, worse than I can tell you. 

[Signed] John. Pope, Major-General. 

A true copy: T. C. H. Smith, Lieut.-Col. and A. D. C. 



71 

Headquarters Army of Virginia, ") 
Near Centreville, Sept. 1. 1862. j 
3faJ.-Gen. Franhlin^ — General: — Gren. Pope directs you to estab- 
lish your grand guards on the pike from Centreville to Warrenton. — 
An outpost of one regiment of infantry and two pieces of artillery of 
Reynolds' division has been ordered to take post on the same road. 
I am, General, very respectfully, your ob't serv't. 

[Signed,] Geo D. Ruggles, Col. and Chief of Staff. 

A true copy: T. C H. Smith, Lieut.-Col. and A. D. C. 



Headquarters Army of Virginia, ) 
Near Centreville, Sept. 1, 1862. } 
To the Officer Commanding the forces around Fairfax Court-House : 
— Gen. Pope directs that you furnish one regiment of infantry as an 
escort for a wagon train from Fairfax Court-House to Fairfax Station. 
Lieut. Devens, 9th Infantry, will call for the escort as he proceeds 
through the town. 

I am. Sir, very respectfully your obedient servant, 

(Signed,) Geo D. Ruggles, Col. and Chief of Staff. 

A true copy: T. C. H. Smith, Lt. Col. and A. D. C' 



Headquarters Army of Virginia, \ 
Centreville, Sept. 1, 1862 — 11 oclock, a. m. j 
Maj.-Gen. Halleck : — The enemy is deploying his forces on the 
Little River Pike, and preparing to advance by that road on Fairfax 
Court-House. This movement turns Centreville, and interposes be- 
tween us and Washington, and will force me to attack his advance, 
which I shall do as soon as his movement is sufficiently developed. I 
have nothing like the force you undoubtedly suppose, and the fight 
will be necessarilly desperate. I hope you will make all preparations 
to make a vigorous defence of the intrenchments around Washington. 

[Signed,] John Pope, Maj.-Gen. Commanding. 

A true copy : T. C. H. Smith, Lieut.-Col. and A. D. C. 



Centreville, Sept. 1, 1862, — 12 m. 
Maj.-Gen. McDowell: — You will march rapidly back to Fairfax C. 
H. with your whole division, assuming command of the two brigades 
now there, and immediately occupy Germantown with your whole force, 
so as to cover the turnpike from this place to Alexandria. Jackson 
is reported advancing on Fairfax with twenty thousand men. Move 
quickly. 

(Signed,) John Pope, Major-Gen. Commanding. 

A true copy : T. C. H. Smith, Lieut.-Col. and A. D. C. 



Headquarters, Army of Virginia, ) 
Centreville, Sept. 1, 1862—1 p. m. J 
Major-Gen. Hooker : — You will at once proceed to Germantown, 
assume command of the troops arriving at Fairfax Court-House, to- 



72 

gether with the brigades now under conamand of Cols. Torbert and 
Hincks. 

By command of Major-G-en. Pope. 
(Signed,) Geo E. Ruggles, Col. and Chief of StaflF. 

A true copy : T. C. H. Smith, Lieut. Col. and A. D. C. 



Headquarters Aemy op Virginia, | 
Centreville, Sept. 1, 1862—12:30 p. m. } 
Col. A. T. Torhert, Cumd'g Brigade near Fairfax C. H. — Move 
your brigade at once to Germantown, and join it to the one under Col. 
Hincks at that place. Maj.-Gen. Hooker is assigned to the command 
of the forces arriving at Fairfax C. H. from Washington, together 
with those stationed at Germantown. 

By command of Maj.-Gen. Pope. 
(Signed,) Geo. D. Buggies, Col. and Chief of StaflF. 

A true copy : T. C H. Smith, Lieut. Col. and A. D. C. 



Near Centreville, Sept. 1, 1862 — 4 p. m. 
Maj. Gen. McDowell : — If you hear a battle raging to night near 
Centreville, advance to the north, keeping your communications open 
with Bene, and near to him ; also, by the right with Hooker, who will 
advance his left to your right. 

By command of Major-Gen. Pope. 
(Signed,) Geo D. Buggies, Col. and Chief of StaflF. 

A true copy : T. C. H. Spiith, Lieut. Col. and A. D. C. 

Headquarters Army of Virginia, ) 

FairfaxC.H., Sept. 1, 1862. J 

General Orders No. — : The Army Corps of Heintzelman, Sigel, 
Sumner, Porter and Beno, as soon after daylight as possible, will begin 
to draw slowly to their right in the direction of Fairfax Court-IIouse, 
until they come closely in contact with each other. Major-Gen. Beno 
will follow as closely as possible the line of the old Bailroad now oc- 
cupied by him, the others along the pike. He will notify those in his 
rear of his exact position, and every step of his movements, and will 
ask support if he needs it. They will not be more than half a mile 
in rear of him. If any severe engagement should occur at any point 
of the line, the army corps commanders nearest on the right and left 
will immediately send forward a staflt oflficer to report to the General 
commanding the troops of the attack, and to notify him that they stand 
ready to support him if he needs it. For the present, the general 
headquarters will be established at Fairfax Court-House. 
By command of Major-Gen. Pope. 
[Signed,] Geo D. Buggies, Col. and Chief of StaflF. 

A true copy : T. C. H. Smith, Lieut Col. and A. D. C. 

Headquarters Army of Virginia, ) 
Centreville, Sept. 1st, 1862—2 p. m. } 
Col. Torhert : — Send back word immediately to Alexandria to 



73 

hurry up Couch's Division, and all the troops coming from Washing- 
ton to (jrermautown. They must be at Germantowu as early this 
afternoon as possible — certainly to night. They must take up strong- 
positions there. There is no doubt' the enemy is approaching you. 
Hold on to your position to the last. The whole army is on the move 
to join you. 

By command of Major-General Pope. 
. [Signed] Geo. D. Ruggles, Col. and Chief of Staff. 

A true copy : T. C. H. Smith, Lieut.-Col. and A. D. C. 



Fairfax Court House, Sept. 2d, 1862. 
llajor- General Halleck, Washington: — As I expected, the enemy 
last evening attacked my right furiously in the direction of Fairfax 
C. H., but were repulsed with heavy loss. Our loss was also severe. 
Gens. Stevens being killed, and Kearney missing. The enemy has 
not renewed the attack this morning, but is undoubtedly again beating 
around to the north-east. Your telegram of this date is just received, 
and its provisions will be carried out at once. 

[Signed] John Pope, Maj.-Gen. Commanding. 

A true copy : T. C H. Smith, Lieut.-Col. and A. J). C. 



Headquarters Army or Virginia, 
Fairflis Court House, Sept. 2d, 1862. 
[Circular.] 

The following movements of troops will at once be made, in accor- 
dance with the instruction from the War .Department, viz. : 

1. Banks' Corps will march by the Braddock Road and Annandale, 
and take post at or near Fort North. 

2. The Corps of FrankHn and Hooker will pursue the Little River 
Pike toward Alexandria. 

3. Heintzelmau's. Corps, the Braddock Road toward Fort Lyon. 
McDowell's Corps, the road by Fall's Church, Little River and 

Columbia Pike toward Forts Craig and Tyllinghast. The Corps of 
Porter, Sumner and Sigel, via Vienna, toward the Chain Bridge. 
These three latter Corps will keep well closed up, and within easy 
supporting distance of each other. 

The cavalry under Gen. Buford will follow and cover the march of 
the three Corps of Porter, Sumner and Sigel ; and Bayard the troops 
marching on the road south of it. Sumner will bring up the rear on 
the route he is ordered to pursue. Hooker will cover the rear on the 
Little River Pike, and Banks the rear on the Braddock Road. Gen. 
Banks will call in the forces from Sangster's and Fairfax Stations, and 
will break up the depot at the latter place, shipping all stores by rail 
to Alexandria. The wagon trains, except such as are in immediate 
use by the Corps, will pursue the Little River Pike to Alexandria. 
The commanding oflScers of Corps will send forward a capable officer 
to Alexandria to take charge of their respective trains, and will con- 
duct them to the headquarters of their respective Corps. The Medi- 
cal Director will take immediate steps to have all the sick and wound- 
10 



74 

ed carried back to Alexandria. Gen. Reno will take up the line of 
march immediately by the Little River Turnpike to Alexandria. — 
The commanders of these various Army Corps will send forward, sev- 
eral hours in advance, Staff Officers to notify Gen. McClellan of their 
approach to the points which they are to occupy. 
By order of Major-Gen. Pope. 

GeoD. Rucjgles, Col, and Chief of Staff. 
A true copy : T. C. H. Smith, Lieut.-Col and A. D, C. 



Headquarters Army of Virginia, ") 
Fairfax, Sept. 2d, 1862, j 
Maj.-Gen. HallecJc : — The whole army is returning in good order, 
without confusion, or the slightest loss of property. The enemy has 
made no advances this morning, owing no doubt to his severe loss last 
evening. Three army corps pursue the route via Vienna to Chain 
Bridge, covered by all the effective cavalry. Ten corps by the Brad- 
dock road. These last corps are ordered to break up the depot at 
Fairfax Station, call in the troops from Sangster's and elsewhere on 
the railroad, and to move back to Alexandria. Our whole wagon train 
is far in advance of us toward the same place. Our whole force is less 
than 00,000 men. Everything is being safely moved back to the in- 
trenchments. When the stragglers can be assembled, our force will 
be largely increased, I shall leave here with the last and encamp to- 
night near Ball's Cross Roads. 

(Signed,) Jno. Pope, Maj.-Gen. Com. 

A true copy : T. C. H. Smith, Lieut,-Col. and A. D. C. 



New York, Jan. 27, 1863. 
A dispatch was received from Maj.-Gen. Banks on the second of 
September stating that the wagon trains in his charge had all been 
brought in safely. Nothing lost, This dispatch has been mislaid. 

T. C. H. Smith, Lt.-Col. and A. D. C. 



Headquarters Army OF Virginia, ) 

Ball's Cross Roads, Sept. 2, 1862—7:10 p. m. J 
Major-Gen. Halleck, — Gcneral-in cldef, Washington: — I arrived 
here safely. Command coming in on the road without much molesta- 
tion. ' Some artillery firing on the roads through Vienna and Chain 
Bridge, but nothing of a serious character so far as I can learn. — 
Within an hour all the commands on the other roads will be in camp 
within the intrenchments. The three corps on the Vienna and Chain 
Bridge roads by to-morrow morning. I await your orders. The enemy 
still continue to beat around to the north. I do not myself believe that 
any attack here is contemplated. The troops are very weary, but 
otherwise in good condition. 

(Signed,) John Pope, Major-Gen. Com'g. 

A true copy : T. C. H. Smith, Lieut.-Col. and A. D. C. 



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